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Executive Summary
This report describes the outcome of nine sets of workshops and pnvate meetings on current diplomatic and 
security problems related to nuclear arms control Part One of the report starts with key observations from each 
of the five countries visited m a senes of workshops and meetings from 18 March-6 Apnl 2001 It also 
summarizes relevant information from subsequent meetings m Geneva and from Annecy m France from 21 23 
May and m Washington on 20 June 2001 Part Two provides a longer narrative explaining how these 
observations inform an overall understanding of the current impasse on multilateral aspects of nuclear arms 
control and how this impasse may eventually be broken Key to this is finding a mechanism to convince China 
that U S national missile defense (NMD) efforts will not require further additions to already planned Chinese 
strategic modernization in order to avoid undermining the credibility of China s nuclear deterrent If and when 
this understanding can be achieved those interviewed in China seemed convinced that other impediments to an 
agreement on an end to unsafeguarded fissile matenals production might be overcome This was not 
inconsistent with the view from South Asia, provided that sufficient time elapses for Pakistan to build up its 
nuclear capabilities and other issues do not induce Japan Israel and other key countnes to block agreements 
necessary to get India and Pakistan on board
Four appendices are also included with this report Appendix A gives a list of participants m meetings m 
London Pans Beijing Islamabad, New Delhi Geneva and Annecy France and in a follow on meeting with 
Russian interlocutors m Washington DC Appendix B gives a list of questions posed at the workshops m the 
first five of these locations Appendix C gives the questions posed for the Washington meeting Appendix D 
updates the previous work m light of events and meetings after the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United 
States These mclude a workshop on U S views of Russia and multilateral nuclear disarmament on 12 October 
2001 at the University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign and a senes of pnvate meetings on the same subject m 
Berlin from 8-12 November 2001 It was concluded from these meetings and subsequent events that the current 
U S administration is unlikely to be willing and able to address China s concerns about NMD adequately to 
unblock the current impasse on nuclear arms control Nor did the U S -Russian summit that commenced dunng 
the Berlin meetings address Russian concerns on NMD m a way that would also satisfy China
The conclusion m Berlm was that a potentially fruitful activity for the time being may be to investigate 
approaches to possible future discussions on military activities m outer space Three possibilities were discussed 
that could plausibly become mutually agreeable to the United States China and other mterested states should 
the key problem of clarifying the extent of U S NMD deployments eventually be adequately addressed These 
include a) providing the demilitarized mtemational space station with a status similar to the treaty protection 
afforded to Antarctica b) discussing limitations on military activities beyond geosynchronous orbit and 
c) clarifying the status under the Outer Space Treaty of extraterrestrial bodies and materials extracted from 
them
/
Part One Trip Report
Introduction
(This part contains C Singer s revisions to a report by A Sands and R Gottemoeller )
In London and Pans Cliff Singer and Amy Sands were joined by Dmshaw Mistry of the Stanford University 
Center for International Secunty and Cooperation The team conducted workshops m London on 19 March and 
Pans on 23 March 2001 In Beijing Cliff Singer and Amy Sands were joined by Rose Gottemoeller of the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and this team conducted three additional workshops m Beijing on 
30 March Islamabad on 2 Apnl and New Delhi on 6 Apnl In addition to these workshops meetings with 
governmental and non governmental specialists were held m each of the five capitals Cliff Singer then 
participated in a seminar and workshop arranged by the Monterey Institute of International Studies respectively 
in Geneva and nearby m Annecy France from 21 23 May Finally Cliff Singer Amy Sands Rose Gottemoeller 
and Jim Goodby participated m a meeting for the project with Russian interlocutors m Washington on 20 June
Two common questions emerged during our discussions m London and Pans
What is necessary to come to an accommodation with China on multilateral aspects of nuclear arms 
control7 Is it just an understanding that U S NMD will not attempt to undermine the credibility of the 
Chmese nuclear deterrent or does China have cntical broader concerns about U S plans for military 
dominance based m outer space9 This seems to be an open question m Europe to which the answer must 
be sought in Chma
Will European concerns really be taken into account during strategic consultation with the United 
States concerning NMD and military uses of outer space9 Neither the current British nor French 
governments have much enthusiasm for national missile defense nor interest in any kind of weapomzation 
of outer space The French may be more vocal than the British m questioning policies they see as upsetting 
the strategic balance but neither feels public opmion pressing them to either make an open nft with the 
Umted States nor yet re-open the question of their own levels of nuclear armament
Major Points from Discussions and Workshops in London and Pans
London
The group held an open meeting with two keynote Member of Parliament speakers m London and held private 
meetings at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) at the Ministry of Defense and with non 
governmental specialists The impasse in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) over Prevention of an Arms 
Race in Outer Space (PAROS) blockmg Fissile Materials Production Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) negotiations was a 
central topic m many of these talks Key points of discussion included the following
1) Trends m international context
a Much uncertainty remaining in the international political system
b Certainty of spreading availability of WMD technology bases 
c Shift from capabilities to vulnerabilities as a basis of U S threat assessments
3
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2) NMD is a looming issue that could be a catalyst to a worsening situation in the arms control arena 
dependmg on what the Bush Administration proposes and how they pursue it diplomatically
a Russia will probably be willing to cut a deal (deep nuclear weapons cuts funds for cooperative 
threat reduction modify ABM Treaty no NATO expansion possibly CTBT)
b China will be the real problem
c The British see threat a bit differently from the United States (valumg deterrence more and not 
seemg a scale of threat justifying NMD costs) but do not want to publicly rock the boat within 
special relationship with Americans
One comment Britain should seek more from the United States than support for European Rapid 
Response Force and base its interactions with the Umted States on its own definition of its own 
national security needs
d NMD will not be available to deal with rogue threats in the near term so there will be continued 
reliance on deterrence
e Verification may become more informal but needs to reassure states on irreversibility o f the 
process
f  The UK is not terribly engaged yet on PAROS issues
3) Possible solution to CD bemg stalled Take PAROS out of the CD and start discussions with the 
United States if necessary See if the telecommunications industry will encourage the United States to 
re engage Start pre FMCT discussions out of the CD and have full time scoping discussions start 
there eventually to be taken back into the CD Some questioned whether this would really be that 
useful
4) A fully non discriminatory approach to limits on nuclear weapons holdings that supplements the 
NPT might be problematic for the Japanese body politic
5) Europe needs to seek alliances with non aligned countries and to engage Chinese and South Asian 
states more extensively Comment Europe needs to do its own threat assessment
Paris
The group was hosted by the Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS) for an open meetmg 
and held private meetings at the Defense and Foreign Ministries and the National Assembly and attended a 
separate meetmg dealmg with energy supplies The IRIS meetmg was originally conceived as a debate over 
NMD policies but evolved into a more cooperative approach covering a broader range of security questions 
Key points from these meetings were as follows
1) The French see benefit and logic in NMD but question the politics of it
a NMD deserves legitimate discussion but key is the nature of U S announcements on NMD and 
nuclear strategic reductions (How deep are cuts do they include tactical nuclear weapons and 
what is scale and scope of NMD7)
b The net effect is seen as probably negative m the international context, but became better 
understood during our discussions as bemg seen as important m the U S domestic context
c The decision on NMD is happenmg in a context where pessimism within Russia Europe and 
China pervades relationships because of the CTBT ratification fiasco Kosovo campaign bombing 
of the Chmese embassy no START II landmine treaty rejection and Kyoto accord rejection
d Europe needs a deal with Russia on NMD and deep cuts in nuclear weapons for both Russia and 
the Umted States including tactical nuclear weapons It also needs NMD not to be or appear to be 
targeted at China—this would not sit well with Europeans Also it will be problematic if NMD 
mvolves weapons based in space
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e The French tend to see the threat very differently—in terms of a need for theater missile defenses 
and regional defenses not for temtonal defenses where deterrence still works
f  The United States is trying to eliminate a sense of vulnerability while Europeans have learned to 
live with vulnerabilities
2) The French are realistic and pragmatic on South Asia they see a need to set aside the legitimacy issue 
and pursue practical approaches to containing deployed capabilities with the FMCT capping the 
nuclear programs of China, India Pakistan and Israel
3) Europe is an aging power and not very interested m issues of power
a Nuclear reductions by French are irreversible (with testmg and fissile production capabilities 
permanently dismantled) but may have reached a plateau that France will remain at until others 
catch up and the French public is ready for further reductions
b The public and press are concentrating on domestic and regional issues so the French government 
is not very mterested except where French jobs and local concerns are affected
4) France is looking for the following from the United States and Russia before it will engage m nuclear 
arms reduction discussions strategic stability retained (ABM Treaty or like remains) U S Russian 
levels of nuclear weapons go down and nonproliferation efforts effective on horizontal and vertical 
levels French won t say this officially because there is no consensus on bemg committed to it
5) The French do not care for weapons bemg put mto space but also do not want to limit their own other 
military options m space as they have new capabilities m pipeline
a The French believe that Chinese have concerns about PAROS that go beyond NMD
b There is a possibility of new coalition against the Umted States if it does not contain NMD
c Putting interceptors or other offensive weapons mto space is a major threshold for the French who 
would be womed about negative ramifications of such a move
6) US unilateralism may become a problem even if reductions occur in parallel
a Lack of a formal treaty encourages all to hedge since there is no guarantee of irreversibility and it 
appears that the United States wants to keep all of its options open
b The United States appears aloof to norm based arms control
c Mutuality of security concerns appears muddled and to be bemg questioned
Major Points from Discussions and Workshops in Beijing, Islamabad and New Delhi
Three overarching questions emerged during our discussions m Beijing Islamabad and New Delhi
Why does the United States feel so insecure7 As one Chmese specialist said If the United States is not 
secure then China must be m hell
Why is the United States trying to upset the stable balance between offense and defense by 
emphasizing defense7 Offensive deterrence still holds true nobody is undeterrable including Saddam 
Hussein Rogue leaders know that if they attack the United States they nsk bemg blasted to total 
destruction The Umted States can be prepared to deal ruthlessly with rogues through 
counterproliferation measures not waste money on missile defenses
Why is the United States going it alone7 Why this push toward unilateralism7 The United States cannot 
have good intentions m this regard it must be seeking further global superiority
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Beijing
The group visited Beijing pnor to the aircraft incident in early April Therefore the last U S Chinese 
interaction had been the rather successful visit of the Chinese Vice Premier to Washington immediately before 
our arrival and this success colored the tenor of the discussions in a positive manner Interlocutors were 
Ambassador Sha head of the Treaty and Legal Directorate in the Chinese Foreign Ministry General Pan head 
of the Strategic Studies Department of the National Defense University and a number of impressive younger 
researchers (see attached list m Appendix A) Key points were as follows
Pnor to the aircraft incident, the Chmese were stressing the let s talk theme The Vice Premier had heard 
a positive message from President Bush during his visit that there was a real threat requmng the 
construction of a missile defense system but this system would not be designed against China The Chinese 
stated that on that basis they were ready to enter mto a dialogue with the United States so that the 
Amencans could make their case
The Chmese stated a firm preference for continuing with existing nonproliferation and arms control 
regimes They outlined three scenarios (a) steady as she goes with existing regimes and energetic efforts 
to negotiate new regimes principally the Fissile Matenal Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) (b) negotiate on a 
completely new basis e g start from scratch on the ABM Treaty (c) take a wholly unilateral approach 
with no cooperative diplomacy Accordmg to our interlocutors China prefers scenano (a) which is a 
different view from that often expressed a year earlier when Chinese experts were conveying regret for 
having participated m the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) process and were arguing that 
negotiated arms control efforts had somehow failed China
Islamabad
Interlocutors m Pakistan included a number of senior retired diplomats and academic experts (see attached list 
in Appendix A) The discussions indicated a number of clear directions for Pakistan s arms control diplomacy 
and a considerable amount of pragmatism m the ideas offered
Most of the mterlocutors indicated that Pakistan can and should de link from India on the issue of ratifying 
the CTBT They argued that the move would have immediate economic benefits m that the Japanese 
would release the hold that they had placed on assistance to Pakistan after the May 1998 nuclear test What 
is more the ratification would not have much practical meaning because the Treaty could not enter mto 
force until the United States had ratified it which was not going to happen anytime soon
The Pakistani experts stressed that the impact of U S actions on the South Asian regional nuclear situation 
was strong For the situation to stabilize they argued they need an atmosphere where arms control is being 
promoted By contrast U S insistence on missile defenses and unilateralism is a setback for regional 
stabilization For example if Russia is tempted by U S emphasis on missile defenses to sell theater missile 
defense technology to India then the impact on Pakistan would be severe
Several of the experts argued that if we cannot find a comprehensive solution to the problems posed by the 
relationship of India and Pakistan to the Nonproliferation Treaty regime then we should find a way to de 
link nuclear safety and security from these problems In particular the Pakistanis argued that there is an 
urgent need for matenal protection control and accounting measures m India, to address the threat of 
nuclear thefts from unsafeguarded Indian nuclear reactors (When we asked about unsafeguarded Pakistani 
nuclear facilities they stressed that Pakistan did not really have a sizeable civilian nuclear power industry 
and therefore needed no such help )
New Delhi
By contrast with their Pakistani counterparts our mterlocutors m India conveyed a lesser degree of pragmatism 
m their comments to us They were not at all interested, for example in ratifying the CTBT m order to gain 
diplomatic points or economic advantage despite a situation where the Treaty would not enter mto force 
anytime soon They did convey a clear sense however of some of the major regional implications that they saw 
m strategic shifts underway elsewhere
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The Indian experts argued that a shift is occurring away from an emphasis on the U S -Russian strategic 
relationship to an emphasis on the U S -Chinese strategic relationship They argued that the airplane 
mcident which had occurred by this time in our trip would have no more than an ephemeral effect, but the 
strategic shift would be permanent, and would have a colossal effect on Indian security (Most of the 
Indians who discussed the issue were not particularly impressed with the current importance of Russia )
One Indian expert well known for his criticism of the NPT regime surprised some of us by asserting that 
the regime is actually fine for those who are already signed up to it What we need he stressed was a 
parallel and complementary regime for countries outside of the NPT (From this viewpoint India now has a 
parallel interest with the NPT nuclear weapons states m limiting the number of nuclear weapons states 
even while it refuses to jom the NPT as a non nuclear weapons state and promotes the idea of a more 
comprehensive ‘non discriminatory approach )
Several participants m the New Delhi workshop expressed general support for the Lahore Declaration and 
argued that that was the means by which Pakistan and India should return to nuclear confidence building 
They did not seem particularly keen to involve the Umted States m these activities one highly placed 
retired diplomat for example argued that nuclear nsk reduction should only be conducted on a global 
basis not through the specialized, individual attention of the Umted States (He was not very clear about 
what that would mean in practice ) Their expressed support for the Lahore Declaration was also not backed 
up by any particular enthusiasm for taking practical steps with Pakistan—m fact the statements about 
Lahore stood m contrast to statements about a distaste for bilateral work with Pakistan on nuclear matters
Unlike the Pakistanis the concern that the Indian experts expressed about missile defenses was with regard 
to China, not their neighbor on the subcontinent If the United States insists on deploying missile defenses 
they said, they would not care if China builds up its ICBM force—the problem for India would be m a 
build up of Chinese medium and shorter range ballistic missile systems
Major Points from Discussions and Workshops in Geneva and Annecy, France
Three overarching conclusions emerged during observations m Geneva and Annecy
* An FMCT could probably be drafted given a mandate for negotiation A possible impasse over 
existing stocks of fissile material is potentially manageable by encouraging the placement of excess stocks 
m verified secure storage A new move to conduct a preliminary multilateral dialogue on this issue outside 
oftheCD is however fraught with difficulties
* An ad hoc working group on nuclear disarmament is bkely to concentrate on a broad menu of issues 
The question of just what is the meaning of the ‘unequivocal commitment to nuclear disarmament 
accepted by the permanent UN Security Council Members at the 2000 NPT Review Conference is likely to 
be buned under a plethora of discussion on individual topics This discussion may be along the lmes of the 
13 Steps toward Nuclear Disarmament agreed to at the Review Conference
* There is a perceptual gap between the United States and China on the relevance of PAROS The
Chmese approach gives the appearance of being rigid and thoroughly incompatible with domestic political 
reality within the United States On the U S side the Chmese seem actually to be perceived as making 
unreasonable demands by insisting that negotiations on PAROS be coupled to those on the FMCT
One cannot help but be struck by the very different tenor of discussions in and near Geneva compared to those 
we had with international interlocutors m the various capitals even outside the settings of formal meetings It 
seemed much easier to engage underlying issues constructively m those capitals while in Geneva there are two 
impediments to this The first of these is inevitable frustration with the formality procedural wrangling and 
posturing that goes on in and around a CD deadlocked on issues related to the FMCT One also gets the 
impression that there are constraints on effective communication even outside official forums on the key 
underlying issue of how the PAROS question might eventually be effectively dealt with Whether these are self 
imposed or a response to bureaucratic constraints matters little to the pomt that information flow back to the
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home offices is unlikely to be adequate under such conditions Within this context a mixture of encouraging and 
cautionary messages were received m Geneva and Annecy
• A number of parties with strong interests m the FMCT appear to have adopted either a constructive or 
hands off approach to the key problem of how to deal with existing stocks These include Japan South 
Africa Canada and Israel all of which have substantial capacity for production of various isotopes that are 
particularly useful for nuclear weapons The developmg U S /Russia/IAEA Trilateral Agreement on this is 
seen by many as a politically and technically practical useful precedent for constructing a compromise on 
an irreversible mechanism for reducing stocks of weapons programs fissile matenals Even Pakistan 
appears to envision the possibility of an FMCT being set up m a way that allows for sufficient but not 
excess stocks of weapons usable fissile matenals
• However there is frustration that the FMCT is blocked within the CD and an initiative spearheaded by the 
Netherlands to discuss it temporanly outside the CD is moving slowly Netherlands is part of the so called 
NATO Five (also including Belgium Germany Italy and Norway) The CD was still awaiting the impact 
of a new conservative government being elected m Italy The German delegation was helpful m hosting a 
meeting earlier this year that dealt with FMCT issues However despite the present Green Party foreign 
minister m Germany one gets the impression that nuclear power reactors and genetically modified 
organisms are getting more attention m that country than nuclear and biological arms control
• Outside the United States there was a seemmgly universal preference for avoidmg the placement of 
weapons m space Even from U S quarters there was a caution that ambitious plans for placing weapons m 
space come largely from Air Force brainstorming and represent neither a national consensus nor a national 
policy
• One Russian view saw the third millennium providing opportunities m space beyond our current 
imagination This is a recurring theme m Russia and it suggests that the question of further constraining 
military activities in space beyond geosynchronous orbit might eventually provide a more fruitful avenue 
than discussion of more immediate but contentious issues m regions of space closer to the earth
• Another party who considers the NPT of critical importance noted that the three countries that haven t 
abjured nuclear weapons appreciate the value of the treaty even though they don t want to sign it This 
echoes a comment related above from India and suggests a subtle but important shift from the situation 
prior to the 1998 nuclear tests in South Asia
• There was clear equivocation in Annecy about what is entailed m the unequivocal commitment to nuclear 
disarmament accepted by the nuclear weapons states parties to the NPT at the 2000 review conference One 
participant said that their country s view was hopefully well known and widely shared but that others have 
a different view of what unequivocal means The response to a question about whether it would be a good 
idea to try to clarify this was several resounding answers of no
• There was public and private discussion at the meetings of the possibility of a Fourth UN Special Session 
on Disarmament This is formally overdue and may find some support amongst parliamentarians and semor 
diplomats but it could be quite difficult to organize At some pomt however it could provide an 
interesting forum for discussion of broader issues This is because the CD seems more likely to focus on the 
‘trees of a 13 point plan for nuclear disarmament rather that the forest of how a global commitment to 
comprehensive nuclear management and continuing disarmament might be structured from an overall 
political perspective
It was illuminating to see how perceptually isolated is the U S perspective on missile defense particularly m 
the sense of giving no credence to China s idea that there is a substantive as well as political link between 
PAROS and the FMCT The idea that China might primarily want to avoid negotiating a commitment to a 
fissile material production cutoff while it faces the potential prospect of an open ended offensive defensive 
arms race with the United States seems not to resonate This suggests that an alternate mechanism may 
eventually be needed to connect bilateral Smo American discussions on missiles with the practicalities of 
getting the CD unblocked on the FCMT
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Major Points from a Meeting with Russian Interlocutors m DC
The 20 June gathering at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace m Washington was a bnef 
preparatory meeting for a workshop of U S experts on Russia at the University of Illinois on 12 October 2001 
It addressed three principle questions with the following outcome
A cap on U S missile defenses adequate to ensure the credibility of China’s first strike capability 
would be seen as adequate to ensure the credibility of Russia’s second strike capability Russia would 
also like to preclude mcrease of intermediate range ballistic missiles m Chma and Europe and is likely to 
continue to support the Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty
De facto rather than de jure limits on combined Anglo-French nuclear forces are likely to be 
sufficient to allow continuing U S./Russia nuclear disarmament It is understood that UK reductions of 
nuclear deployments have bottomed out for some time and that any future reductions m French 
deployments (e g on aircraft) are likely to be of marginal importance if and when they eventually become 
politically feasible Russia would prefer proportional cuts m Anglo/French nuclear deployments if and 
when the U S and Russia move below c 1 000 (strategic7) nuclear weapons each but it is realized that 
France could have institutional inertia against such proportional cuts The last round of European cuts m 
nuclear deployments has apparently helped defuse this issue and it is not expected to provide a major 
impediment to progress on other aspects of multilateral nuclear arms control for the readily foreseeable 
future
It is actual expansion of NATO into former Soviet republics rather than the open possibility thereof 
that would seriously comphcate U SÆussian relations on nuclear arms control It would be preferable 
if specific assurances could be given that NATO would not expand into former Soviet republics over 
Russia s objections but it is understood that the structure and politics of NATO s Founding Act makes it 
difficult for clear assurances of this type to be provided
One Russian commentator at the Carnegie Nonproliferation meeting noted in effect that Russia is at least as 
susceptible to the dangers of proliferation or unauthorized access to nuclear weapons as any other country This 
provides a considerable incentive for cooperation with the United States which has broad similar concerns One 
suggestion at our meeting was that a special U S envoy on multilateral aspects of nuclear arms control should 
be appomted to visit at least all of the countries that have declared nuclear weapons tests A novel suggestion 
was that a joint team of U S and Russian envoys should be appomted for the same purpose Given the unique 
nature of this latter suggestion it is interesting that it was not rejected out of hand by the either the U S or 
Russian participants
Part Two Project Conclusions
Overview
Production of weapons grade nuclear matenals epitomizes the symbol and substance of nuclear arms 
competition A global halt to production of weapons grade plutonium and uranium would symbolize the 
capping of nuclear arms races around the world It could also give impetus to the quest for comprehensive 
global nuclear management By this we mean the secure storage of all nuclear weapons and weapons grade 
matenals Secure storage constitutes global nuclear management if it is transparently comprehensive enough to 
build confidence that these matenals are not available to entities that did not themselves produce them
It is widely believed that a global fissile matenals production cutoff is an extraordmanly difficult challenge 
that is unlikely to be met by the end of the current decade It is also widely believed that there are extremely 
senous impediments to achievmg comprehensive global nuclear management in the sense descnbed above The 
theme here is that these views are based on a set of twentieth century perceptions that do not necessanly apply 
to the new nuclear arms control environment of the twenty first century A key perception pertains to China s 
reasons for remainmg at an impasse with the United States on progress towards a fissile matenals production 
cutoff agreement Others important perceptions mvolve the intention behmd U S missile defense programs 
India s reasons and methods for promoting global nuclear disarmament the level of interest m nuclear arms 
reductions in Russia and the United States Japan s reaction to the question of India s nuclear status Pakistani 
recalcitrance and the role of Israel We also look at Chmese attitudes towards verification and the durability of 
international confrontations that have a nuclear dimension
These perceptions were tested agamst the results of a senes of six spnng 2001 workshops and ancillary 
pnvate meetings m the capitals of the seven states that have declared nuclear weapons tests The results present 
a different picture wherein substantial progress towards a global fissile matenals production cutoff may be 
possible m the present decade This would likely be accompanied by and facilitate substantial progress on 
comprehensive global nuclear management in the present and next decade Of course there are reasons that 
these perceptual problems exist m the first place Thus that their solutions be highlighted as m the present work 
is by no means alone sufficient to ensure timely progress It nevertheless points out that progress is possible 
given adequate mechanisms for communication and analysis and may thus be worth the attempt
Current Impasse
The most visible forum for work on a fissile matenals production cutoff agreement is the Geneva Conference 
on Disarmament (CD) There progress is blocked by inability to agree on an agenda for negotiation of a Fissile 
Matenals Production Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) discussions or negotiations on Prevention of an Arms Race in 
Outer Space (PAROS) and an ad hoc working group on nuclear disarmament This is not just a procedural 
problem resulting from CD requirements for universal consensus on the entire agenda before proceeding on its 
individual components Rather it results from an underlying disagreement on how to achieve mutually 
compatible approaches to these three items
In particular the members of the CD have agreed in principle to proceed with negotiations on an FMCT 
and with discussion of an ad hoc working group on the future of nuclear weapons The most visible current 
difficulty lies with PAROS This leads us to the first perception to be challenged here
Chma has broad based concerns on PAROS that require negotiation incompatible with U S plans for 
military use of outer space
We encountered this view particularly in the United Kingdom and France These countries themselves do not 
favor weapomzation of outer space preferring to limit military activities there to reconnaissance and 
communications However they are unlikely to effectively oppose a U S vision for a broader military role in 
outer space They see China as deeply concerned about the broader implications of this issue and thus likely to 
block progress on a broader agenda as long as the Umted States pursues such a vision
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In China, however we uniformly encountered a different view This was that the core issue concerning 
military uses of outer space concerns the threat that space based components of missile defense pose to China 
Within this core issue the key concern is that an open ended U S national missile defense program could 
undermine the credibility of Chma s nuclear deterrent Thus Chma would not close off an option for resuming 
fissile materials production m case of the development of an open ended Sino American offensive/defensive 
arms race
Chma is of course also concerned that theater missile defenses could undermine its perceived capability to 
threaten Taiwan in case the Taiwanese authorities take unacceptable steps that undermine the policy of one 
Chma two systems The key here however is not weapons systems development but whether or not missile 
defenses are actually provided to Taiwan Provision of missile defenses to Japan is also an issue but again the 
central concern here is what level of military assistance is actually provided to Taiwan Since the Nixon era the 
United States has always managed to avoid crossmg the critical line that separates support for Taiwan from 
encouraging Taiwanese independence The results of early high level contacts between China and the George 
W Bush Administration suggest that this will contmue to be the case up through the pomt that China integrates 
mto the World Trade Organization and beyond
Missile Defenses
In Chma we found it broadly understood that the United States could not m fact prevail m an 
offensive/defensive arms race with that country One view which was not broadly disputed was that China 
could counter U S defenses by spendmg as large a fraction of its military budget on offensive modernization as 
the fraction of its own military budget that the United States spends on missile defenses In any case it was also 
universally agreed that Chma would and could spend whatever becomes necessary to keep U S missile 
defenses from undermining the credibility of China s strategic nuclear deterrent There is thus a crucial 
perception m Chma that needs to be dealt with before further multilateral progress is plausible
The United States may enter mto an open ended defensive/offensive strategic nuclear arms race with
Chma
As we discussed m several meetings m China there are five reasons why this will probably not in fact happen 
First, the international diplomatic and security ramifications of an open ended arms race give senous pause for 
thought on this question to about two thirds of the U S public and to the U S Administration as a whole 
Second the armed services in general and the United States Air Force m particular are seriously concerned 
about the budgetary impact on other capabilities Third the U S Navy would much prefer theater missile 
defenses and China s geographic depth is sufficient that these would not likely threaten its strategic deterrent 
Fourth the core constituency of support for pursuit of national missile defense derives from Reagan s vision of 
space based defenses which are likely to dram some research and development resources away from more 
limited systems likely to be most effective against China Fifth and most important the technical difficulty of 
pursuing ever larger scale missile defenses agamst a determined and increasingly wealthy antagonist like Chma 
are fairly transparently unmanageable It seems likely albeit by no means certain that the passage of time over 
the coming decade will clarify this state of affairs and help dispel this particular perception It is even possible 
that sometime in the coming decade a U S administration will assign importance to this problem and take 
proactive measures to make the required reassurance on this point more explicitly clear to Chma
Nuclear Disarmament
South Asia is a critical region for a fissile matenals production cutoff It is also a potentially significant region 
with respect to comprehensive global nuclear management Within South Asia India has long coupled restraints 
on its own nuclear programs with global progress towards nuclear disarmament India is thus likely to jom 
declared non nuclear weapons states m pressing for a more substantive agenda for discussions on nuclear 
disarmament in concert with any progress towards a fissile matenals production cutoff
There would be an impassable roadblock if India were to hold fast to a demand for a ngid time bound 
framework for the elimination of nuclear weapons m concert with a fissile matenals production cutoff A view
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held by some non proliferation advocates is that India is likely to do just this or the functional equivalent This 
is based on the following perception
India s pursuit of a commitment to global nuclear disarmament is just a smoke screen to mask its own 
nuclear ambitions
A test of this perception is India s response to the suggestion of flexibility rather than ngidity m the approach to 
global nuclear disarmament It is unrealistic to expect a commitment to continuation of recent U S -Russian 
nuclear weapons disassembly rates to zero holdings within one to two decades as implicit for example m Rajiv 
Gandhi s widely touted nuclear disarmament plan More realistic for the readily foreseeable future is a 
continuing exponential decime in these assembled nuclear explosives holdings roughly in concert with the 
radioactive decay of the tntium that many of them rely upon In round numbers this corresponds to a half life 
of about twelve years Moreover the expectation of continuing decime at this rate is necessarily tempered by 
the possibility that operational nuclear weapons holdings may well level off at some point, at least temporarily 
This is exemplified by the fact that the United States has made contingency plans for restart of tntium 
production even though it has not as yet executed those plans
With rare exceptions m India we have found a widespread understanding that some flexibility is both 
necessary and possible for that country to be able to participate in more substantive global discussions of 
comprehensive nuclear disarmament This is reflected both m response to specific suggestions for a conditional 
exponential decime m a universal upper limit on assembled nuclear explosives holdmgs and m official Indian 
statements on the question A good example is one of Indian Ambassador Ghose s statements m connection 
with Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations on 20 August 1996 at the Plenary of the Geneva 
Conference on Disarmament
We were not seeking to prescribe a specific time frame which we realise requires detailed 
consideration What we were seeking was a commitment which could have acted as a catalyst for 
multilateral negotiations for the elimination of nuclear weapons within a reasonable time frame The 
striving itself would have rendered the momentum irreversible
Whether senous engagement would indeed provide irresistible momentum is disputed by many but the point 
here is that there is a widespread feelmg m India that this could be the case Within this context India s desire 
for progress on global nuclear disarmament is indeed a senous one albeit one that has been frustrated by the 
Cold War and the subsequent impasse over strategic arms reduction treaties (START) since the late 1990s
Strategic Reductions
One of the reasons that India s press for global nuclear disarmament is readily dismissed as mere incantation 
has been the apparent interest of the United States and Russia m maintaining far larger nuclear arsenals than all 
other countries combmed Until recently the following perception augmented the idea that India (and also 
China) was hidmg behmd unrealistic expectations on global nuclear disarmament
Neither Russia nor the United States is seriously mterested m deep reductions of their nuclear arsenals 
below immediate post Cold War levels
During the Yeltsin era this perception would have been accurate particularly with respect to total operational 
nuclear weapons holdings Powerful political elements m Russia viewed Cold War nuclear weapons holdings as 
Russia s legacy of power There remained considerable disdain for China which manifested itself m the idea 
that eventual nuclear panty between Russia and China was unthinkable The depth of the coming fiscal cnsis 
and its impact on nuclear operational readmess was also not fully anticipated m the early 1990s
With the dawn of the twenty first century Russia has been transformed from a reluctant partner to a clear 
advocate of much deeper cuts m strategic nuclear arsenals President Putin s declared willingness to discuss 
eventual strategic reductions well below an initial drop to 1500 deployed (strategic) nuclear warheads should 
not be dismissed as pure rhetonc much as Reagan s double zero offer for theater nuclear weapons was 
initially discounted This is because Putin s offer reflects two strategic realities One is that a level of 500-800 
operational strategic nuclear warheads would be much more manageable for Russia and also provides it with
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sufficient strategic deterrence under readily foreseeable future circumstances The other is that these levels of 
Russian warheads would lead to substantially less residual damage to the United States under an operational 
scenano where the U S launches a preemptive counterforce strike following detection of preparations or 
execution of an unauthorized launch of part of the Russian arsenal Under this same nightmare scenano Russia 
would also suffer substantially less collateral damage with a prompt U S counterforce attack at the 500-800 
level than at the 1500-3000 level Thus under appropnate political circumstances the lower levels might also 
look less unattractive to Russian operations planners
The confluence of the push towards missile defenses and a Republican presidency has also transformed the 
U S approach to the question of nuclear disarmament This committed the new administration to unilateral cuts 
of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons to below START II levels of c 3000 It even opened up the 
possibility of cuts to as low as the 1500 level preferred by President Putin Now it should be cautioned that this 
is not likely to immediately precipitate a further deep reduction in the number of assembled nuclear explosives 
held by the United States The current administration is likely to want to keep its options open m this regard 
However it may allow some postponement of a decision on restart of tntium production It may also later allow 
substantial cuts in U S assembled nuclear explosives holdings as confidence grows in the durability of parallel 
reductions m operational Russian strategic holdings Moreover if Cold War spillover tensions m Europe 
gradually subside Russia may well be willing to make more transparent the likely decime m the number of its 
fully operational *tactical nuclear weapons holdings
Fissile Materials Production Cutoff
Even if the above mentioned perceptions can be adequately dealt with a universal halt to production of 
weapons grade fissile matenals can t occur as long as any country considers such production essential to its 
secunty Pakistan must thus first produce enough matenal that it feels it has an adequate deterrent against India 
so long as Pakistan feels this is necessary due to tension over its core issue of Kashmir This underscores the 
obvious point that Pakistan wants existing fissile stocks dealt with m any fissile matenal production cutoff 
treaty This approach is not favored by any of the permanent five (P 5) members of the UN Secunty Council 
This approach would be particularly unacceptable to China as long as the United States and Russia maintain 
much larger nuclear arsenals smce m this case China prefers to maintain some ambiguity about the size of its 
holdmgs One perception based on these observations is the following
Pakistani recalcitrance prohibits agreement on a fissile matenals production cutoff m the foreseeable
future
This point of view fails to take account of three basic pomts approach to panty relevance of global arms 
control to India s nuclear capabilities and the impact of global nonproliferation regime breakdown on 
Pakistan s secunty We consider these pomts m turn
Based on commonly used estimates of Pakistani and Indian production capabilities by c 2010 Pakistan is 
likely to approach as close to panty with India as it is likely to get for some time thereafter This is because 
India s national budget and its plans to replace an aging production reactor give it substantially more potential 
unsafeguarded production capability than Pakistan m the following decades While informed Pakistanis may 
feel that commonly quoted estimates understate the difference between Indian and Pakistani production 
capabilities they nevertheless appreciate the pomt that the closest approach to panty m fission weapons 
production capabilities may occur roughly within a decade
At first glance it may seem implausible that global nuclear arms control could have much impact on an 
arsenal as small as that planned for India m the time frame of interest here for fissile production cutoff and 
global nuclear management However the maintenance of a global arms control regime that a fissile production 
cutoff would require and symbolize would require restraint on a Sino American offensive/defensive arms race 
which should feed back into India s perceptions of its strategic needs The subsequent combination of continued 
global nuclear build down and approach to comprehensive nuclear management could well then temper both 
Chma s and India s procurement plans for expensive and long lived delivery platforms such as nuclear 
submarines
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General stress on the global non proliferation regime could act to the disadvantage of Pakistan s security 
similarly to that of many others but m greater than average measure Given the security situation in central Asia 
and its already problematic spillover from Afghanistan to Pakistan leakage outside of state control of nuclear 
weapons or weapons components from the former Soviet Union could disproportionately threaten Pakistan s 
security Moreover possible spillover of offensive/defensive nuclear missile capabilities is viewed in Pakistan 
as a possible major problem if it facilitates India acquiring functional missile defense capabilities from Russia 
or elsewhere
For all of these reasons the Pakistani establishment is by no means happy to simply hide behind global 
nuclear chaos to free its own nuclear program from the threat of sanctions Rather there is considerable interest 
m Pakistan in an orderly global process This is despite the possible difficulty of sanctions if Pakistan delays a 
fissile production cutoff that has become otherwise unblocked globally There is however another side to this 
com As most effective economic sanctions look likely to have completely evaporated there is also the 
possibility that Japan or others may eventually offer Pakistan positive incentives for timely accession to a fissile 
production cutoff
Implementation
Given their military nuclear capabilities and combined importance for export markets progress on multilateral 
aspects is unlikely to occur unless the United States and Russia are capable of acting together to stimulate it 
This raises the question of whether the following perception is correct
The United States and Russia remam too greatly at odds over issues like national missile defense and 
security in Europe to actively cooperate in promoting multilateral nuclear arms control
In fact Russia s concerns about U S national missile defense appear to be effectively subsidiary to China s 
That is for the present at least Russia is likely to remain convmced that the credibility of its second nuclear 
strike capability will not be threatened by a U S missile defense capability limited enough not to threaten the 
credibility of China s first strike capability Sorting this out with China is a prerequisite for further substantive 
progress on multilateral aspects of nuclear arms control so U S -Russian relations on this question don t appear 
to pose any additional serious constraints
The current Russian administration appears to be fairly pragmatic about the symbolism of NATO 
expansion There are serious concerns about logistical connections to Kaliningrad but an insistence that NATO 
formally foreswear the possibility of expansion into the Baltic states without Russian approval seems 
understood to be infeasible Poland will no doubt continue to advocate expansion that would place it behind the 
old front line between East and West in Europe and expansion to provide physical contiguity with Hungary 
appears to be understood to be quite likely On the other hand Germany and some other western European 
states are likely to be very reluctant to pass off on NATO expansion into former Soviet republics over Russian 
objections that lead to a serious disruption of East-West relations Thus it seems likely albeit not certain that 
the issue of NATO expansion will not prove to be a senous complication for cooperation on multilateral aspects 
of nuclear arms control
A challenging question is how to move past the bilaterally dominated Cold War dialogue on arms control to 
deal with a strategic triangle involving China and accounting for the new roles of Western Europe and South 
Asia A fully trilateral U S /Russia/China set of treaties or other agreements is problematic both because Russia 
shares sensitive START I data with the United States and because China wants the other two to build down 
substantially before explicitly limiting its own arsenal A novel suggestion is that the United States and Russia 
should send a paired team of special envoys to at least the other states that have declared nuclear weapons tests 
in order to coordinate approaches to multilateral arms control Such a mission would certainly not be quick in 
the making but if adequately prepared and supported it might achieve results at a speed that would be 
impossible by any other mechanism
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Issues for Future Examination
Japan s Reaction
Even if India is willing to be flexible in its approach to discussions of global nuclear disarmament there 
remains the problem of whether this question can be engaged m a manner acceptable to the states that have 
abjured possession of nuclear explosives Japan plays a potentially critical role here This is partly because of 
the massive virtual nuclear capability in its reactor and reprocessing facilities and partly because of its 
substantial commitment to backmg up its nuclear nonproliferation agenda with financial resources Japan has 
been particularly adamant against expanding the number of states with nuclear weapons status beyond the 
current (P 5) permanent veto members of the UN Security Council This can lead to the following perception
Japan would block substantive discussion on the future of nuclear weapons unless they provide for
differential treatment of India and the P 5
Given the current and foreseeable situation m India such an approach would preclude discussions of nuclear 
weapons futures that include that country This in turn could very well preclude India s timely concurrence with 
development of a fissile matenals production cutoff
A preliminary analysis of this question suggests that while it is mdeed a delicate issue it is also potentially 
manageable The key is to adopt an approach that bypasses rather than confirms or denies the status of India as 
a nuclear weapons state For example discussions of a conditional declining universal upper limit on assembled 
nuclear explosives holdings would be acceptably non discnminatory from an Indian perspective (c f 
Addendum to Appendix B below) This would perhaps not be to Japan s liking on its own However if 
necessanly coupled with substantial progress on an understanding limiting China s India s and Pakistan s 
production of weapons usable fissile matenals this possibility is reasonably likely to be acceptable to Japan 
The key is careful wording and explanation of any proposal and careful attention to the nuances of the internal 
political situation m Japan so that the disarmament bureaucracy has adequate support for interpreting such a 
pragmatically constructive approach to a broader domestic constituency Assuming this can be managed one of 
the key barriers to making such an approach acceptable to a broader set of non nuclear weapons states may also 
have been successfully dealt with
Israeli concerns
Another possibility is that Israel may block a fissile production cutoff Indeed Israel was the state most 
reluctant to agree to brief CD discussions of the FMCT m August of 1998 Moreover the collapse of the Middle 
East Peace Process over the symbolism of Jerusalem s status after agreement on substantive economic issues 
does not inspire confidence that Israel s requirements for broader agreement on nuclear disarmament will 
readily be met This leads to another perception
Although it has incentive to allow negotiations to proceed Israel will not allow agreement to a fissile
matenals production cutoff within the present decade
This neglects the likelihood that Israel is likely to have more than adequate fissile resources for its perceived 
secunty needs well before 2010 While there is a potential issue with highlighting continuing Israeli tntium 
production it is unlikely that the UK, France or China will agree to halt tntium production by then Thus any 
venfication mechanism will need to allow for the possibility of continued tntium production and thus likely 
concentrate on signature fission products from reprocessing rather than actual reactor operations
What the Israeli Pakistani and Chinese cases do suggest is that a conditional moratonum on weapons 
usable fissile matenals production is more likely in the c 2010 time frame than a permanent halt by ratified 
treaty Israel may well link a permanent production halt with development of a better secunty environment in 
the Middle East m case of future escapees from the Nonproliferation Treaty Pakistan is likely to link a 
permanent production halt with the question of existmg stocks Chma may well link a permanent halt with a 
more formal commitment on the part of the United States to avoidance of an open ended offensive/defensive
arms race
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When it comes to comprehensive global nuclear management Israel s case is somewhat different than it is 
for the FMCT This is m part because Israel is only indirectly linked to the continuous nuclear security chain 
mvolvmg NATO members Russia, Chma and Pakistan Thus the continuing progress on global nuclear build 
down that might need to accompany evolution of global nuclear management need not necessarily sweep up 
Israel immediately m a formal process The expectation of tight internal security control on comparatively 
modest fìssile materials holdings and lack of complications from commercial nuclear power may also allow 
Israel to be set aside until later on in this process
Medium Term Possibilities
Dealing successfully with all of the above perceptual problems is a tall order but not conceptually beyond the 
realm of possibility This could allow a scenario something like the following Maximum assembled nuclear 
explosives holdmgs continue to decay with roughly a twelve year half life from a value o f over 20 000 c 1988 
to 10 000 c 2000 to 5 000 c 2012 and possibly lower on a similar trajectory through the following decade 
The United States and Russia may thus avoid restart of tntium production throughout this time period A tacit 
agreement on avoiding an open ended offensive/defensive Sino American arms race is reached in the current 
decade and perhaps converted to a more formal understanding m the following one Pendmg resolution of the 
above mentioned problems only a global understanding on a fissile matenals production moratonum is reached 
by about the end of the current decade This may well be accompanied at least by confidence building 
demonstration safeguards procedures m most or all of the relevant countnes Then previous expenence on 
cooperative threat reduction could later lead to nearly comprehensive global nuclear management with all 
weapons usable matenals expected to be confined to declared sets of facilities and well inventoned 
transportation systems Dunng this penod Anglo French cooperation might evolve to the point where a more 
explicit response could be given to Russian concerns about combmed Anglo French nuclear capabilities should 
there mdeed remam such concerns after decades of contmumg economic interdependence between Russia and 
the European Union
All of this could set the stage for subsequent multilateralization of the nuclear arms reduction process 
mcludmg mcreasmgly broad based declarations of pre existing stock levels Nominally this schedule would 
lead to universal upper limits on assembled nuclear explosives holdmgs of 2 500 in 2024 1 250 in 2036 and 
625 in 2048 but of course over such long time frames the actual course of events is almost completely 
unpredictable Still bemg explicit about such possibilities does have the advantage of pointing out an additional 
relevant perception
Chmese reluctance to engage the verification issue will scotch global nuclear arms control
The counterpoint here is that China has already agreed in principle to the idea of verification of a fissile 
matenals production cutoff so long as such venfication does not compromise confidential information 
concerning past production history And with a continuing Chmese production moratonum and no more than 
factor of two uncertainty in an estimate of 600 weapons worth of existing stocks baselining China s past 
production m preparation for multilateral reductions would nominally not be necessary for a third of a century 
Thus although an earlier global baseime might be desirable for building confidence m the absence of 
significant secreted stocks dunng subsequent reductions it should by itself hardly be a necessary condition for a 
contmumg U S -Russian tntium production moratonum for more than another human generation
Long Term Considerations
Within the present context the question of nuclear reductions contmumg to the point of panty with conventional 
military capabilities may seem so remote as to be unworthy of comment However the question of eventual 
elimination of assembled nuclear explosives holdmgs appears to be conceptually significant to both proponents 
and opponents of contmumg nuclear disarmament, so it does deserve bnef mention here Indeed this brings us 
to one final misperception
Enduring conflict will prohibit indefinite extension of a contmumg global nuclear disarmament 
process
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Confrontations over three areas involve states that have not abjured nuclear weapons and are thus directly 
relevant here Palestine Kashmir and Taiwan For each of these dialogue came tantalizingly close to apparent 
success m the year 2000 and then receded The Middle East Peace process faltered over the status of Jerusalem 
The Lahore declaration movement towards normalizing Indo Pakistani relations foundered over the Kargil 
adventure Cross straits dialogue ran afoul of the semantic question of whether acceptance of the one Chma 
principle was a precondition or topic of discussions In each of these cases the sticking pomt was symbolic 
rather than of economically relevant temtonal substance The status of Jerusalem was primarily a question of 
state symbolism rather than commercial reality The Ime of control in Kashmir is a de facto border given the 
political/military realities in South Asia with the possible exception of the economically worse than useless 
Siachen glacier so argument over its formal status is futile from an economic perspective Cross straits tensions 
are merely an impediment to more efficient trade between Taiwan and the mainland and the one China, two 
systems concept does not necessarily imply substantive changes m economic relations aside from possible 
mutually beneficial completion of normalization It is indeed the symbolic rather than economically substantive 
nature of the remaining issues that makes each of these confrontations so resistant to the process of trade 
normalization that has helped alleviate classical seventeenth-nineteenth century sources of international conflict 
between major powers
Another common element m these three confrontations is that they reflect incomplete evolution of political 
systems in the post Cold War environment The end of the Cold War removed Soviet support for Syria and 
helped precipitate limited Palestinian self governance but Palestme has yet to evolve a stable enough 
governance system to allow its leader to negotiate a peace settlement on the basis of an established popular 
mandate Pakistan is still reeling from heavy military involvement m governance This in turn produced a 
dynamic and unstable interaction with policy on Kashmir resultmg from and influencing justification for 
unsustainably high levels of military spending The political process m Taiwan is only now recovenng from the 
imposition throughout the Cold War of Nationalist rale imported from the mamland and the new Taiwan 
leadership has yet to formulate a convincingly stable policy on the question of declaring independence
The history of the past sixty years on the European continent in Ireland and around the globe should give 
one serious pause for thought about the idea that historically durable conflict will necessarily persist in anything 
like its present form for the next sixty years Yet on a continuation of the above nuclear arms reduction schedule 
many countries could maintain the 300 assembled nuclear weapons sufficient to totally devastate a oval 
throughout all of the next sixty years Thus it hardly seems plausible to predict with any confidence that a 
process leading to reductions below such a level more than sixty years from now is predictably precluded by 
what now seems the intractable nature of the three conflicts discussed above
Additional antagonists that might become visibly nuclear armed could anse in Korea the Persian Gulf or 
some other unspecified location However the confrontation m Korea hardly seems headed in a direction where 
other states being limited to c 300 nuclear weapons would be militanly relevant Such a level of nuclear 
weaponry is also quite sufficient to totally devastate Iraq or Iran Trends in the declining petroleum intensity of 
industnalized countnes economies also require attention They bnng into question the idea that a program of 
reductions leading to industnalized countnes holdmg no more than 300 nuclear weapons over sixty years from 
now is predictably precluded by concerns over dependence on Persian Gulf oil m such a distant future With 
respect to other unspecified conflict in such a distant future having a nuclear dimension that prevents continuing 
nuclear disarmament the idea that globalization trends cannot dispel such concerns is a very hypothetical 
construct to place in the way of practical international diplomacy in the here and now
Conclusion
Based on pre existing analysis and an intensive set of international consultations conducted particularly for 
this study we have examined nme variously held perceptions related to the questions of fissile matenals 
production and comprehensive global nuclear management We have constructed plausible cases for how these 
perceptions might be successfully dealt with This demonstrates the possibility of considerable progress on 
these matters over the course of about two decades What this analysis does not do is to determine the 
probability of such progress It is clear that perceptual difficulties have evolved out of a long process during the 
nuclear age in the twentieth century What is not yet clear is how twenty first century events and passage of
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generations will change perceptions and allow or disallow substantive progress The purpose here is not to make 
a prediction on this matter but merely to be part of the process
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M Cédnc Pneto Responsable Etas Unis Ministère des Affaires étrangères 
Mme Amy Sands Center for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute 
M Clifford Smger Director Program in Arms Control Disarmament and International 
Secunty University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
Lieutenant Colonel Philippe Steinmger Division <Euratlantique>
Section OTAN MA
M Bruno Tertrais Charge de mission auprès du directeur
Delegation aux Affaires Stratégiques (DAS) Ministère de la Defense 
Colonel Andre Var Affaires Internationales et Stratégiques SGDN
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3) Beijing Meetings (25-31 March 2001)
a) Dinner with Ambassador Sha and his Deputy (28 March 2001)
b) CHS (29 March 2001)
Luo Renshi 
Zhang Yunling 
Liu Chao
c) Dinner banquet w/CIIS (29 March 2001) hosted by Pei Changhong and Han Feng
d) WORKSHOP Cooperative Global Approaches Agamst Nuclear Tensions 
Institute of Asia Pacific Studies CASS (30 March 2001)
Session 1
Speakers Chair Mr Han Feng
Mr Clifford Smger on Cooperative Approaches to Arms Control 
Comments Mr LiBin
Mr ShenDinglion Friendly relations w/ US and Russia 
Comments Rose Gottemoeller
Ms Amy Sands on Global Considerations 
Comments Mr TangShiping
Session 2
Speakers Chair Ms Amy Sands
Mr Gu Guoliang on Suggestions for Improvement or Alternative Approaches
Comments Mr Clifford Singer
Ms Rose Gottemoeller on Facilitating Progress 
Comments Mr XuWeidi
Summary by Mr Pan Zhenqiang and Ms Amy Sands
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Beijing Workshop Participants
Fang Jinying Associate Professor China Institute of Contemporary International Relations 
GuGuoliang Deputy Director Institute of American Studies 
Chmese Academy of Social Sciences
Rose Gottemoeller Senior Associate The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
Han Feng Assistant Director Institute of Asia Pacific Studies 
Chmese Academy of Social Sciences
Han Hua Associate Professor School for International Relations Peking University 
LiBin Associate Professor Institute of International Studies Qmg Hua University 
Liu Huaqiu Reseach Fellow Program on Arms Control and Disarmament,
Chma Defense Science and Technology Information Center 
Pan Zhenqiang Professor Institute for Strategic Studies National Defense University 
Amy Sands Professor Monterey Institute of International Studies 
Clifford E Singer Professor University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign 
Shen Dingli Professor Center of American Studies Fudan University 
Tang Shiplmg Assistant Fellow Institute of Asia Pacific Studies 
Chmese Academy of Social Sciences
Xu Weidi Associate Professor Institute for Strategic Studies National Defense University 
Zhang Yunling Director Institute of Asia Pacific Studies 
Chmese Academy of Social Sciences 
YaoYunzhu Professor Department of Foreign Military Studies 
Academy of Military Science
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4) Islamabad Meetings (1 3 April 2001)
a) WORKSHOP The New Nuclear Arms Control Environment A Parallel Bilateral Approach
The Institute of Regional Studies Islamabad (2 April 2001)
Luncheon
Session 1 Discussions led by US Participants Bndgmg the Gap on Nuclear Arms Control Dealmg 
with the United States and Russia Global Consideration
Speakers Cliff Smger
Amy Sands 
Rose Gottemoeller
Session 2 Discussions led by the Pakistani Participants Resolving the 
Impasse -  Alternative Approaches Facilitating Progress
Speakers Ambassador (Retd) Najmuddin Shaikh
Lt General (Retd) Kamal Matmuddin 
Lt General (Retd) Talat Masood 
Dr Shireen M Mazan 
Prof Sayed Riffat Hussem 
Mana Sultan 
Bng NaeemA Selik 
Amar N Butt 
Bng Feroz Hassan 
Bng Bashir Ahmed 
Maqsudal Hasan Nun
Islamabad Workshop Participants
Cliff Smger 
Rose Gottemoeller 
Amy Sands
Ambassador (Retd) Najmuddin Shaikh
Lt General (Retd) Kamal Matmuddin
Lt General (Retd) Talat Masood
Dr Shireen M Mazan
Prof Sayed Riffat Hussem
Ambassador Khalid Mahmood, Director
Maqsudal Hasen Nun
Bng Feroz Hassan
Bng Beshir Ahmed
Amar N Butt
Bng NaeemA Selik
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5) New Delhi Meetings (5-7 April 2001)
a) Jasjit Singh Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis (5 Apnl 2001)
b ) K Subrahmanyam (5 Apnl 2001)
d)T C A Rangachan Ministry of External Affairs (7 Apnl 2001)
d) WORKSHOP The New Nuclear Arms Control Environment
A Parallel Bilateral Approach Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (6 Apnl 2001)
Luncheon
Session 1 Discussions led by U S Participants Bndging the Gap on Nuclear Arms Control 
Dealing with the Umted States and Russia, and Global Considerations
Speakers Prof Clifford Singer
Ms Amy Sands 
Ms Rose Gottenmoeller
Session 2 Discussions led by Indian Participants
Speakers Prof Kanti Bajpai
Balance sheet of Success and Failures in Arms Control m the Last Decade 
Dr G Balachandran NMD/TMD and Nuclear Arms Control 
Dr P R  Chan Prospects of Proliferation/Nonproliferation in this Decade 
New Delhi Meeting Participants
Prof Kanti Bajpai Disarmament Studies Division School of International Studies Jawaharlal 
Nehru University 
Dr G Balanchandran Columnist 
Suba Chandran Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies 
P R Chan Director Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies 
Barthélémy Courmont Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques 
Amb Ene Gonzales Formerly with the Ministry of External Affairs 
Amb I P Khosla Indian Council for South Asian Cooperation 
formerly with the Ministry of External Affairs 
Somka Gupta Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies 
Mallika Joseph Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies
Bharat Kamad Centre for Policy Research formerly on National Secunty Advisory Board 
Gen Ashok Knshna, Deputy Director Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies 
Amb Dennis Kux
Prof Chmtamani Mahapatra, Amencan Studies School of International Studies Jawaharlal 
Nehru University
Maj Gen Ashok Mehta regular columnist and TV commentator
Prof Sui]it Mansmgh Jawaharlal Nehru University
Amb G Parthasarthy Former High Commissioner to Pakistan
Arpit Rajain Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies
T C A Rangachan Ministry of External Affairs Additional Secretary
Karen Sawhney Co Director International Centre for Peace Initiatives
Anand Verma Formerly m Cabinet Secretanat
Lt Gen A M Vohra, Former Army Vice Chief
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6) Geneva and Annecy Meetings (21 23 May 2001)
a) INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR Next Steps for Nuclear Disarmament and Arms Control 
Thinking Outside the Box Palais des Nations Geneva 21 May 2001
Monterey Institute of International Studies (MHS) and 
Umted Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) 
with the assistance of The Permanent Mission of Canada to the CD
10 00 10 15
10 15 10 30
10 30 11 30
11 45 12 45
13 00 15 00 
15 15 16 30
Welcome / Introduction
Tanq Rauf (Monterey Institute) and Patricia Lewis (UNIDIR)
Opening Under Secretary General Jayantha Dhanapala
Session I FMCT and CTBT The Challenge of Stocks and EIF 
Chair Camille Grand (IEP)
Lawrence Scheurman (MHS)
Seiichoro Noboru (Japan)
Munir Akram (Pakistan)
Marc Vidncaire (Canada)
Session II A Pearl Harbour in Space9
Chair Vladimir Petrovsky (UNOG)
Tanq Rauf (MHS)
Chnstophe Carle (UNIDIR)
Yun Kapralov (Russian Federation)
Fu Zhigang (China)
Luncheon hosted by the Permanent Mission of Canada
Host Ambassador Chnstopher Westdal
Session I Strategic Stability and Reductions
Chair Patncia Lewis (UNIDIR)
Lewis Dunn (SAIC)
Harald Mueller (PRIF)
Camille Grand (IFRI)
William Potter (MIIS)
Conclusions and Recommendations
Presenter Ennque Roman Morey (UN/DDA Geneva Branch)
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b) INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP
Re Assessmg the Challenges to the Global Nuclear Non Proliferation Regime 
L Imperial Palace Hotel Annecy France 21 23 May 2001
Monterey Institute of International Studies
21 May (Monday)
19 00 21 00 Dinner
Speaker Under Secretary General Jayantha Dhanapala 
The State of the Global Nonproliferation Regime 2001
22 May (Tuesday) 
09 30 09 45 Welcome / Introduction Tanq Rauf (Monterey Institute)
09 45 1145 Session I Combating Challenges to the NPT Regime 
Chair William Potter (Monterey Institute)
Patricia Lewis (UNIDIR)
Harald Mueller (PRIF)
Perla Carvalho (Mexico)
Senchiro Noboru (Japan)
12 15 13 15 Session II Preoanng for the 2002 NPT PreDaratorv Committee 
Chau- Hannelore Hoppe (DDA/UN)
Tanq Rauf (Monterey Institute)
Ben Sanders (PPNN)
Darach MacFhionnbhairr (Ireland)
15 30 17 00 Session III Missile Defence and Preserving International Stability
Chair Tanq Rauf (Monterey Institute)
John Simpson (Mountbatten Centre)
Yun Kapralov (Russian Federation)
Camille Grand (IEP France)
Lewis Dunn (SAIC)
17 30 18 30 Wrap Up Discussion and Recommendations Sessions I. IL III 
William Walker (St Andrews) and Rebecca Johnson (Acronym Institute)
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7) U S /Russia Meeting (20 June 2001)
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Washington DC 
Participants
Renee de Nevers MacArthur Foundation
James Goodby former U S Ambassador
Rose Gottemoeller Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Yevgeny Myasmkov Moscow Institute for Physics and Technology
Alexander Pikayev Nonproliferation Program Carnegie Moscow Center
Vladimir Rybachenkov Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ivan Safranchuk PIR Center for Policy Studies in Russia
Amy Sands Monterey Institute for International Studies
Clifford Smger University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign
Chris Wmg Ford Foundation
Appendix B Questions Posed Abroad
Background
For this project a group of U S participants will gather input m the United Kingdom France China, Pakistan 
and India concemmg steps that the United States and Russia might plausibly be expected to take over the 
commg decade to facilitate progress on multilateral aspects of nuclear arms control These suggestions will be 
discussed first with experts from the United States and Russia and then with those from other countries The 
project has identified four specific background questions and one genenc question for comment in the five 
countries to be visited The background questions are
1 Is Anglo French dialogue likely to progress sufficiently over the commg decade m a European context to 
allow a coordinated response to Russian concerns about nuclear capabilities m Europe9
2 Assuming missile defense deployments are not open ended and there is continued progress m reductions of 
U S and Russian nuclear deployments at what point might China be willing to enter mto discussions of 
transparency measures relevant to multilateral aspects of nuclear arms limitations9
3 Assuming that any other countries of concern show sufficient restraint m policies on deployment and use of 
nuclear weapons might Pakistan eventually be willing to engage m substantive discussions on phased 
approaches to more comprehensive and global understandings concemmg nuclear weapons matenals9
4 Given adequate signals of global interest in continuing reduction of nuclear arms deployments does India 
have flexibility concemmg the form that discussions of global nuclear futures might take9
Comment is also sought on issues related to these questions The genenc question is
a) What are feasible and plausible actions that the United States and Russia might undertake that would signal 
an mterest m continuing progress on nuclear aims control and could lead to more constructive multilateral 
engagement with other countnes9
In particular need these signals mvolve active encouragement of multilateral dialogue on continuing reductions 
of nuclear arms deployments or mere demurral to other countnes interests along these lines9 If neither is 
forthcoming would it suffice that there eventually be additional progress in the commg decade on reductions 
beyond the mtent announced by the new U S administration along with collateral Russian actions9 Then how 
much transparency will other states seek concemmg the U S -Russian bilateral arms control9
The project participants are open to hearing concerns about current policies but the primary purpose is to 
look for constructive and realistic suggestions about what may emerge in a new nuclear arms control 
environment beyond current difficulties
The New Nuclear Arms Control Environment
More dramatically than ever since the years immediately following the demolition of the Berlin Wall the new 
U S administration is poised to mold a completely new nuclear arms control environment Indeed we are 
entering a period when the Umted States is going to be reducing its strategic nuclear arsenal whether or not 
others reciprocate meaning in particular Russia President Bush said during his campaign that it should be 
possible to reduce the number of American nuclear weapons significantly further than what has been agreed 
under START II and without having to rely on ‘years and years of detailed arms control negotiations Bush 
cited approvingly the example of the 1991 unilateral reductions m tactical nuclear weapons m the Soviet Union 
and Umted States Huge reductions were achieved in a matter of months making the world much safer more 
quickly In his first comments on foreign policy after inauguration Bush reiterated his determination to reduce
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U S nuclear weapons unilaterally I think it s important for us commensurate with our ability to keep the 
peace to reduce our nuclear arsenal on our own I am going to fulfill that campaign promise
While he was talking about unilaterally reducing U S strategic nuclear weapons Bush restated his 
determination to build a national missile defense (NMD) system My point is that I want America to lead the 
nation—lead the world—toward a more safe world when it comes to nuclear weaponry On the offensive side 
we can do so and we can do so on the defensive side as well There are of course senous domestic concerns 
about a U S decision to deploy any NMD system (including a Phase 1 system with about 100 missile 
interceptors) These mclude the technical feasibility of starting to deploy a functional system at this time the 
need for anticipating future threats that have not actually materialized and the utility of NMD in face of various 
other available methods for delivering weapons of mass destruction Indeed polling has shown that a 
substantial majority m the United States would fail to support NMD deployment if many scientists doubt the 
system will work as m fact many scientists do both for current Phase 1 plans and longer term prospects for 
destroying warheads accompanied by penetration aids Nevertheless if the U S President continues to hold 
firm m his resolve to reduce U S strategic nuclear weapons deployments below START II levels and deploy an 
NMD system it is unlikely that skeptics in the United States will be able to derail either one of these initiatives
President Putin for his part, has clearly signaled that he is ready to go beyond the 2 000-2 500 limit for 
strategic nuclear weapons agreed to in the Clinton-Yeltsin Helsinki Protocol of May 1997 In a November 2000 
statement, Putin stressed his readmess to reduct to a limit of 1 500 or even lower What is more he expressed a 
willingness to move forward unilaterally just as Bush had proposed We agree with an opinion being voiced in 
the USA that such an agreement will not require protracted talks or a fresh beginning most importantly now 
Russia and the USA should start to smoothly move forward jointly or m parallel towards radically lower 
ceilmgs for nuclear warheads At the same time while noting the need to adjust to new circumstances Putin 
restated Russian commitment to the ABM Treaty regime Russian spokesmen had for over a year been issumg 
dire warnings that if the United States walked away from the ABM Treaty then Russia would walk away from 
START the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and other long standing treaty and arms control 
agreements
Thus if the U S and Russian governments follow through with then declared policies the Phase 1 NMD 
deployment decision could shatter like a hammer striking crystal the current framework of bilateral arms control 
agreements However the possibility would remain that the United States and perhaps m parallel Russia would 
continue with unilateral reductions below START II strategic nuclear weapons deployment levels The Bush 
Administration approach clearly is one in which negotiations and treaty instruments take a back seat to 
consultations discussions and less formal interactions between the United States and other countries on the 
future of the strategic balance Informal approaches clearly have their risks for U S counterparts since they do 
not m the end tie the United States or any other party at the negotiating table to legally bmding government to 
government agreements However this new environment also presents opportunities because shifting from 
START I to below START II deployment levels is a necessary step in the march towards more comprehensive 
multilateral nuclear arms control measures The issue addressed here is whether the vestiges of the previous 
bilateral arms control framework will impede or enable further progress
Many would argue that much more progress is needed For as dramatic as they may be in percentage terms 
reductions from START I to below START II nuclear weapons deployments will still leave two countries 
without an ongoing military confrontation but still each possessmg thousands of readily deliverable nuclear 
warheads Is this situation to continue indefinitely7 If so then the current policies of the other countries that 
have declared nuclear weapons tests will at best preclude further reductions on their part If not then the world 
may be approachmg a state where more senous multilateral dialogue is pertinent to further progress There are 
two types of dialogue that will have to be improved m the process
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The Multilateral Arms Control Impasse
For the time bemg the multilateral arms control agenda is hung up on a triangle of three issues These are
a) Prevention of an Arms Race m Outer Space (PAROS)
b) The F issile Materials Production Cutoff T reaty (FMCT)
c) Discussions on the overall future of nuclear weapons
Clearly the difficulties over PAROS will not be resolved until questions have been resolved about U S NMD 
deployments and other countries have decided upon deployment responses if and as they deem appropnate An 
interesting question is whether at that pomt it might be possible to either drop PAROS from the agenda or 
reconfigure discussions along more mutually acceptable lmes Examples might be enhancing barriers to 
interference with non military uses of outer space or solidifying barriers against the use of extraterrestrial 
matenals for military purposes In any case it will take some time perhaps much of the present decade until 
technical and political considerations clanfy any likely U S NMD deployments and any responses they 
precipitate
It may take a comparable amount of time before each of the relevant countnes is comfortable enough with 
the interplay between its own capabilities and those of its neighbors and global counterparts to engage m senous 
discussion of either an FMCT or functionally equivalent understandings However progress on this issue in a 
broad multilateral framework may be difficult without some parallel discussion concerning the overall future of 
assembled nuclear explosives holdings One can envision three different types of approaches to this more 
general topic In one the states with the largest assembled nuclear explosives holdings actively promote 
discussions aimed at the goal of more comprehensive global management Another approach is for these states 
to demur to the wishes of other states to explore this topic without either impeding or actively encouraging this 
In the addendum below an excerpt of a possible conceptual framework is provided that might help avoid 
contentious formal posturing during such a multilateral discussion A third approach is for the United States 
and Russia simply to report on further bilateral progress towards comprehensive nuclear management with the 
continuing pace of this progress being sufficient to avoid impeding progress on multilateral issues
Internal Dialogues
A necessary condition for multilateral progress will be constructive internal dialogue particularly within the 
various countnes that have declared nuclear weapons tests Progress m the Middle East peace process could 
also be helpful However for obvious reasons raising this question within the Middle East lies outside the 
scope of the present project
The U S body politic has long been fatigued with policies based on Cold War logic and the concept of 
mutually assured destruction of entire national infrastructures However there is also unresolved tension 
between the ideas of panty stability and the alternative of deterrence through collateral damage from a 
counterforce nuclear strike In Russia there remain questions concerning the role of nuclear weapons referred 
to as tactical In Europe there are questions concemmg Anglo French cooperation and the relationships between 
each country s nuclear forces and European and NATO defense policies China will presumably want to make 
an evaluation of the likely technical capabilities resulting from U S missile defense activities and whether or 
not these influence its own plans India has a draft nuclear doctrine but will undoubtedly evolve its approach as 
a result of external developments and continuing mtemal dialogue Pakistan will no doubt keep an eye on other 
countnes capabilities and conduct an mtemal dialogue on resource allocations
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Project Goals
The primary purpose of the present project is not to try to influence the internal dialogues of the countries being 
visited, but rather to bring home constructive and practical ideas that may influence approaches to internal 
bilateral and multilateral dialogue For indeed all of these dialogues are necessarily interrelated Internal 
dialogue conditions approaches to bilateral and multilateral issues Conversely perceptions of potential threats 
posed by the capabilities of the largest arsenal abroad and globally distributed mass destruction capabilities also 
fashion the mtemal dialogue concerning nuclear diplomacy and strategy All of the countries to be visited for 
this project now have significant opportunities to shape and influence U S thinking in particular at a time when 
a new U S administration is trying to move the debate on nuclear weapons well beyond its Cold War origins 
This is why an exercise like this project is so important It would be very helpful to obtain as much constructive 
mput as possible particularly on both the relevant background question and the generic question raised above
Addendum to Appendix B Excerpts from a Declaration Concerning Nuclear Explosives Holdings
The following excerpts illustrate one possible approach to bridging the gap between calls for a prescribed time 
bound framework for elimination of nuclear weapons and the less specific commitments concerning nuclear 
disarmament that have been made by a number of states that have declared nuclear weapons tests One of the 
two key point is item 12 which call for non discriminatory periodic proportional reductions rather than a 
linear reduction to zero The other is item II 1 which allows for the possibility that future generations may or 
may not encounter a pomt where further reductions can not be accomplished at least as fast as originally 
envisioned The dates and numbers deliberately left blank here could in principle be filled in through a formal 
negotiating process aimed at a declaration to be made with or without a designated depository However the 
basic purpose of this text is not to suggest a formal negotiation structure but merely to provide a conceptual 
vehicle for recognizing the concerns embodied in various approaches to the problem of nuclear disarmament 
The remainder of the full text has articles dealmg with use of nuclear weapons matenals encouraging additional 
agreements that further limit the production testing possession or means of delivery of nuclear weapons and 
allowing for cancellation of adherence with specified advance notice on grounds of supreme national interests 
A version of the full text and background discussion can be found m The Washington Quarterly 20 (summer 
1998) pp 199-210 and is available in various languages through the Publications link at the 
http //www acdis urne edu website (For a complementary approach see Michael Mazzar s monograph on 
virtual nuclear arsenals at the http //www csis org/pubs/wr_vnamtro html website )
I Limits on Possession of Nuclear Explosive Devices
1 Beginning m (___) the number of nuclear explosive devices held by any country subscribing to this
Declaration will be no more than (___)
2 Subject to the limitations under Article II of this Declaration the limit on the number of nuclear
explosive devices held by any country subscribing to this Declaration [hereinafter Adherent] shall be 
reduced by a factor of (__ ) at the end of every subsequent ( ) year period
II Exemptions from Lowered Limits
1 Any Adherent may exempt itself from a lowering of the limit on the number of nuclear explosive devices
it may possess by giving notice (__) years m advance of the effective date of such lowered limit This
notice shall include a statement of the reasons for its refusal to accept a lower limit
2 The limit on the number of nuclear explosive devices held by any active Adherent shall not be increased
Appendix C Questions for U S /Russia Meeting
Here we pose three sets of questions raised by a recent set of workshops and meetings m London Pans Beijing 
Islamabad, and New Delhi These meetmgs and questions are aimed at defining conditions for breaking the 
current impasse on multilateral nuclear arms control
The current impasse is reflected m a disagreement within the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) on 
whether discussions or negotiations on prevention of an arms race m outer space (PAROS) should accompany 
negotiation of a fissile matenals production cutoff treaty (FMCT) and discussions m a working group on 
nuclear disarmament Discussions in the above mentioned capitals suggested that progress on the PAROS 
question might allow progress in negotiation of an FMCT over the present decade provided that undue discord 
in a working group on nuclear disarmament can be avoided Whether FMCT negotiations would lead to a 
ratified treaty or merely a broadened moratorium on fissile production for weapons production is an open 
question More contentious are the following types of questions related to what a working group on nuclear 
disarmament would actually discuss and what the conditions are for breaking the impasse on PAROS
China and India appear to have somewhat flexible approaches to discussions on nuclear disarmament They 
are nevertheless likely to msist m the long run on embracing a concept of eventual rough interim international 
panty in total operational nuclear weapons holdings albeit not necessanly m the technical sophistication of 
those weapons This raises the following questions
Even without a profound change in the current international secunty situation might Russia be willing to 
entertain the concept of eventual panty with other political entities in total operational nuclear warheads 
albeit for quite some time at substantially higher total numbers that those for operational strategic nuclear 
warheads9 If so is it sufficient for the commg decade that France and Bntain exercise restraint in 
deployments and cooperate on discussions of multilateral aims control rather than making formal 
declarations accepting the idea of future limits on their combmed holdings of operational nuclear weapons9
Assuming adequate Anglo-French restraint on nuclear deployments there remains the question of the state of 
Russian dialogue with NATO With respect to the historically sensitive question of the theoretical possibility of 
NATO expansion mto the former Soviet republics one presently finds senous mterest in this m very few NATO 
countries This raises the following questions
Given the organizational difficulty of NATO members formally precluding expansion into the former Soviet 
republics before including Russia is the absence of this sufficient for substantial mutual reductions in total 
operational nuclear weapons holdings9 Is it even necessary9
Finally a necessary and perhaps sufficient condition for China and the United States to agree to unblock CD 
negotiations is for China to become convmced that U S national missile defense deployments are expected to 
be capped at a level that will not undermine the credibility of China s modernizing nuclear arsenal This raises 
the following question
If and when the United States gives China assurances on missile defense that suffice to resolve the PAROS 
impasse are these assurances also likely to be sufficient for Russia9
The answers received will serve as a basis for briefings in Washington and Moscow and a final report on a 
project sponsored by the John D and Catherine T MacArthur Foundation
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Appendix D After 11 September 2001
This appendix was prepared by Clifford Singer and has three purposes First it reports on the results of an 
afternoon meeting on Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Unblocking the Impasse on Nuclear Arms Control 
held at the University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign on 12 October 2001 Second, it summarizes general 
impressions based on meetings on the same topic between Clifford Smger and various governmental and non 
governmental interlocutors in Berlm from 8 12 November 2001 These were both made possible by support 
from the John D and Catherine T MacArthur Foundation Third it contains a bnef discussion of the impact of 
the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States and subsequent events including the U S -Russian summit 
in early November o f2001 This appendix ends with some comments on prospects for future constructive work 
relevant to multilateral aspects of nuclear arms control
Can the United States Engage on Multilateral Nuclear Arms Control7
For the 12 October meeting a panel of three experts and a score more m the audience were provided with the 
above material and asked to comment on its implications and pose and respond to relevant questions The panel 
consisted of
Gen (ret) William Odom
Director of National Security Studies at the Hudson Institute 
Formerly Director of the U S National Security Agency
Prof David Holloway
Director of the Institute for International Studies at Stanford University 
William Smirnov
Head of the Department of Political Science 
Institute of State and Law Russian Academy of Sciences
In the audience were the European Union s Washington political representative Jonathan Davidson and a 
variety of mterested parties from the Russian and East European Center and other organizations at the 
University of Illinois at Urbanar-Champaign The primary purpose of the exercise was to analyze the likely U S 
response to the conclusions that had been drawn from interactions with foreign mterlocutors What follows are 
some major points from this meeting These points are an amalgam of various points made by various speakers 
and do not necessarily represent consensus views
• Russia will not return as a major power for at least two decades and quite possibly never
• Russia has been trapped in a path dependent lock of weak institutions and economy due to vested interests 
in the status quo Russian generals have resisted change contributing to military decay A weak tax system 
keeps the government incapable of re funding the military These realities are m conflict with a legacy of 
impenal culture
• The June 2001 Sino-Russian cooperation recognized Chinese influence m central Asia and left Russia with 
a need for a highly cooperative relationship with the West
• NATO remains relevant because it is not just a military alliance but with the International Monetary Fund 
and World Bank, part of a global liberal governance system that has survived after the Cold War and keeps 
other conflicts such as Turkey/Greece at bay
• One view was that, objectively there is little that either the Umted States or Russia can do about each other 
(in the intermediate term) This is despite the observations that subjectively many Russian leaders Putin 
has to deal with would like to frustrate the other states courting of the United States while many m the 
United States would like to help Russia
39
40 Appendix D After 11 September 2001
• One question that raised some interest was whether Russia might be guaranteed stable oil and gas pnces 
(by the European Union and possibly the United States) m return for a longer term commitment not to join 
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countnes
• In the 1990s the United States lost some illusions it had on Russian ability to integrate with NATO and 
Russia lost some illusions about the sustainability of its power After 11 September 2001 the Russian 
approach is getting more focussed on the Russian national interests of rescumg the Russian state in terms of 
international security building an effective market economy and constructing a foreign policy that 
recognizes the predominance of the Umted States in the international system
• Russian foreign policy experts recently have expressed only moderate concerns about U S national missile 
defense (NMD) developments with NMD being cited as a major threat by about one fifth as a possible 
threat by two fifths and as not a threat by the remaining two fifths
• Underlying Putin s position that other treaties pertinent to nuclear arms control are conditioned on 
continuing ABM treaty compliance is a realization that at least 5-7 years are needed to reform the Russian 
military One conclusion is that discussions on nuclear arms control are not likely to work out evenly 
between the United States and Russia
The following day at a companion workshop on more general aspects of U S -Russian relations Clifford Smger 
gave a summary of how the above input and the events smce 11 September influence a view of the global 
situation relevant to multilateral nuclear arms control
The question to be addressed here is where recent events may signal the start of a new global concert, 
analogous to the Concert of Europe after the Napoleonic Wars It is true that the Concert of Europe 
experienced some difficulties at the margins particularly with Italy m 1818 Nevertheless it arguably managed 
to transform thinking m Europe smce 1648 from how to manage war to how to keep the peace for about two 
generations A century later Woodrow Wilson s attempt at a new global concert failed Half a century after that 
there was a new European concert but only m the West
Now a global concert is needed to maximize domestic security against non state actors Key questions are 
whether such a global concert can be constructed, and what Russia s role will be With respect to Russia 
domestic reform will be a gradual process where the role of Europe will be much more important than that of 
the United States Energy is an important relevant factor The United States may be able to help catalyze and 
facilitate the evolution of more stable energy markets but Europe is Russia s largest energy customer and 
would have to take the lead on this
What about nuclear weapons9 Precisely because they are not now and cannot become militarily important 
in relations between NATO and Russia if there is to be an adequate concert between them it is now possible to 
tackle the potentially very important problem of nuclear matenal protection control and accounting in Russia 
The history of cooperative threat reduction between the United States and Russia has inevitably had many 
problems but also a number of successes Soviet nuclear materials were widely dispersed during the Cold War 
partly to avoid target concentration The cleanest mechanism for dealing with nuclear weapons matenals is to 
acquire them promptly from Russia and place them m secure facilities elsewhere (or in a smgle very secure 
facility in Russia) and then denature them m an orderly way over the following years To get Russia to agree to 
more of this however requires an overall set of non treaty agreements on deployment of much smaller levels of 
nuclear weapons This m turn may require capping NMD at some level that deals with U S concerns on 
escapees from non proliferation but is not perceived by Russia as undermining the credibility of its nuclear 
arsenal
It is of course not certain what will actually happen concerning the broader question of global concert and 
the narrow question of nuclear arms control over the present decade A reasonable guess is that the United 
States and Europe will learn to live with less security than they otherwise could have because they will fail to 
grasp the opportunity to establish a truly global concert More likely but still uncertain is that it will prove 
possible over the commg decade to bring Russia into a more limited concert In this process it may prove 
possible to substantially reduce the chance of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of non state 
actors and bemg used agamst participants m the concert
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German Perspectives and Future Prospects
Despite the remarkable degree of rapprochement evident between the United States and Russia, it was already 
apparent during our 8 11 November Berlin meetings that the United States was not prepared to give Russia any 
substantive assurances concemmg eventual limits to U S NMD deployments The analysis given above seemed 
to be viewed as reasonably convincing so conversations turned to the question of what might be fruitfully 
discussed concerning military uses of outer space that might eventually become acceptable to a U S 
government and still of potential utility vis a vis Chma and Russia
Concemmg weapons m outer space German interlocutors had two things m common with their Bntish and 
French counterparts One was a reluctance to see weapons placed in outer space The other was a belief that 
their government would be reluctant to challenge U S policy on this matter Thus neither the European Union 
nor its three largest states are likely to directly challenge current U S vision for military activities in space 
They could nevertheless well look favorably on any plausible approach that would resolve the impasse between 
the Umted States and Chma on the question of Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS)
In the meetings in Germany the three topics for possible eventual discussion of PAROS were received with 
interest
a) providing the demilitarized international space station with a status similar to the treaty protected afforded
to Antarctica
b) discussing limitations on military activities beyond geosynchronous orbit
c) clarifying the status under the Outer Space Treaty of extraterrestrial bodies and materials extracted from
them
It was understood that the mtemational space station has even higher construction cost and comparable 
symbolic value to the World Trade Center and is highly vulnerable to a comparatively simple sounding rocket 
with accurate guidance system A coordinated mtemational approach to its protection could thus be of interest 
to the United States and many other parties This could involve building confidence that that neither state nor 
non state actors have earth based assets configured m such a way as to be an immediate threat to the space 
station It could also prepare a coordinated international response in the event that such a threat materialized or 
was earned out
Limiting or banning military activities beyond geosynchrous orbit would seem to have negligible impact on 
all current military plans The current situation beyond geosynchronous orbit is fairly analogous to the situation 
with Antarctica before that continent was demilitanzed by International treaty While the region beyond 
geosynchronous orbit is remote its size is literally astronomical and its demilitarization could be of 
considerable long-term importance
While the Outer Space Treaty prohibits military use of extraterrestrial bodies it is mute on the question 
of military use of matenals that might be extracted from them A possible example is hydrogen oxygen or 
other chemicals for rocket fuel The dollar cost of launching these matenals from earth is currently lower but 
the energy cost is higher than bnnging them to earth orbit from extraterrestnal sources such as earth 
approaching asteroids or the moon With sufficient operating expenence m space this could eventually be of 
potential military significance but it does not figure m any current military plans As with the more general 
question of military activities beyond geosynchronous orbit this raises the question of what mechanisms if any 
should eventually be put mto place to interpret or venfy the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty
The possibility of convemng a one day workshop c June of 2002 in Berlm on these questions was 
discussed and will be pursued
Another question that was raised m some of the Berlm meetmgs was investigating the possibility of a 
fourth UN Special Session on Disarmament This was in the context of the Declaration on Reductions of 
Nuclear Explosives Holdings referred to and excerpted from m the Addendum to Appendix B above This 
calls for a universal exponentially decaying upper limit on any country s assembled nuclear explosives 
holdings subject to the important caveat that such reductions would be suspended (but not reversed) upon 
advance notice of reasons why upcommg reductions will not be realized When it was first written m 1995 and
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published in 1997 this suggestion looked incompatible with the stalemate on post START I U S -Russian 
nuclear arms control treaty negotiations m the Yeltsin-Clinton period The Putin-Bush November 2001 summit 
and the continuing de facto U S -Russian moratorium on tritium production shed a different light on this Now 
the idea that maximum operational nuclear weapons holdmgs might decline by a factor of two every 10-12 
years from their Cold War peak for an indefinitely long time into the future seems not only possible but even 
probable For after a decade or more of future functioning strategic partnership between Russia and NATO it 
would be peculiar mdeed if the United States and Russia each still felt compelled to maintain thousands of 
operational strategic nuclear warheads only for the reason that the other also maintained such large numbers 
Should this come to be realized then further reductions are to be expected If instead the NATO-Russia 
relationship unexpectedly sours to the point where this is not the case then this would be just the kind of the 
situation envisioned in the above mentioned caveat on suspending future reductions
A virtue of addressing such an over arching vision m a UN special session on disarmament is that it helps 
avoid the technical minutiae that the Geneva Conference on Disarmament often gets entangled in A difficulty 
is that a modest change m the political climate in Europe and elsewhere and a significant change m the political 
climate in the Umted States would likely be necessary before such a special session could actually be called 
Nevertheless the process of discussing the calling of such a session to take up what is at least m principle a 
politically practicable outcome might possibly make a useful contribution to the needed changes m political 
climate
Questions for EU Day
The present comments have been prepared to make the connection between two workshop sessions that follow 
the 3 April 2002 State of the European Union Address by John B Richardson the Ambassador of the EU to 
the United States at Illinois annual European Union Day These two sessions are entitled The Coalition 
against Terrorism U S -EU Cooperation and Global Security and Arms Control The European Role 
Unilateralist tendencies m U S foreign policy were dealt a serious but not decisive blow by réévaluation 
following last 11 September Clearly Europe is now centrally important for interdicting financing for violent 
non state actors any senous attempt at long term stability m Afghanistan and any large scale U S operations in 
its Central Command area that includes the Middle East The interactions of NATO s EU countries with Russia 
will also be very important for the future of securing storage of weapons usable nuclear matenals in dealing 
with post Soviet weapons of mass destruction expertise more generally Weapons of mass destruction will 
themselves remain on center stage The now transparent vulnerability of developed countnes makes the idea 
that these weapons would gradually fade away as an issue of concern after the Cold War is now thoroughly 
demolished
For the current Bush administration the die is pretty much cast when it comes to policies dealmg with 
weapons of mass destruction Four cntical decisions have already been made These are the rejection of a 
broadly supported agreement on the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) unilateral rejection of the 
Antiballistic Missile (ABM) treaty over the objections of Russia and Chma the completion of a Nuclear Posture 
Review and the reversal of an earlier intention to gut the Cooperative Threat Reduction program with Russia 
There seems little prospect that the current Bush administration will visibly cap national missile defense (NMD) 
plans start disassembling thousands of de mounted nuclear weapons nor restart nuclear testing of deep earth 
penetrating warheads The time has thus come to look forward to succeeding U S administrations and how 
Europe and the rest of the work might interact with them on questions related to weapons of mass destruction
Neither the current Bush administration s policies nor some more ambitious suggested alternatives are 
likely to be politically viable in the current decade even if a successor U S administration is far more inclined 
to emphasize global cooperation when it comes to dealing with weapons of mass destruction In particular the 
current administration s policies contain at least two inherent contradictions One contradiction is that an 
unbounded U S national missile defense program puts the country on a collision course leading to an 
unbounded offensive nuclear weapons build up by China, while at the same time cooperation with Chma on 
economic matters and arms transfers is essential A second contradiction involves maintaining operational 
readiness of thousands of demounted nuclear weapons that have no plausible use as far as the eye can see By 
about the end of the decade the decay of tntium stocks needed for operational readiness will bring this into
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focus and a succeeding administration will very likely override the decision to maintain such large numbers in 
operational readiness There is also some tension between maintaining a moratorium on nuclear testing and 
designing more rugged earth penetrating nuclear weapons delivery packages Whatever the technical viability 
of doing such designs with only zero yield nuclear testing it seems likely that political stalemate will preclude 
either renewed testmg and or the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) promoted by some 
advocates of more aggressive international engagement on cooperative multilateral arms control
On CTBT ratification in particular and on a number of other military denuclearization steps more 
ambitious plans are very likely to find the needed support in the U S administration and Congress These 
include strengthening the ABM treaty and ratification of new formal U S -treaties on nuclear weapons and 
their delivery vehicles as called for m a 13-step program agreed upon at the year 2000 Nonproliferation Treaty 
review conference
So what is potentially feasible within the current decade given a successor U S Administration with a 
stronger mterest m multilateral cooperation on reducing the likelihood of use of weapons of mass destruction*? 
There are six initiatives that might provide the basis for a broader consensus between such an administration 
and the U S Congress and the wider public
• Cap U S NMD deployments at least until another country deploys ICBMs
• Establish regular consultations with China on WMD and military use of outer space
• Put priority on a global moratorium on production of fissile matenals for nuclear weapons
• Agree to a plausible agenda for discussing the future of nuclear weapons m Geneva
• Enhance cooperative threat reduction programs with Russia
• Sign a BWC agreement and then work for broader global cooperation
The first four of these are almost mextncably intertwined, and successful pursuit of the package they constitute 
could facilitate the last two
After the current U S administration abandoning U S NMD deployments altogether is likely to be 
politically difficult but also not necessary Simply maintaining as a test bed for the technology a planned four 
deployed launchers and even a comparable number more m the production pipeline is not likely to be a major 
impediment to good relations with other countries What is necessary from a Chinese perspective is that the 
U S not be engaged in an unbounded missile defense build up that would substantially alter China s plans for 
nuclear force modernization This could be clarified through a program of regular consultations with China 
which might have the added benefit of helpmg to avoid an unbounded competition on threat and protection of 
space based military assets such as communications and reconnaissance satellites What satisfies Chma m this 
regard is likely to satisfy Russia and other countries are unlikely to deploy an ICBM threat in time to derail 
progress during the current decade on the remainder of the program outlined above Within this context 
negotiations on a fissile matenals production cutoff treaty (FMCT) could recommence at the Geneva 
Conference on Disarmament (CD) While this is unlikely to result in an FMCT entenng mto force in the current 
decade it could well result in a global production moratonum if the Umted States and Japan cooperate 
effectively on providing incentives for Pakistan to cooperate
Unblocking the impasse in the CD also requires agreement on a discussion program for an ad hoc group on 
the future of nuclear disarmament One possible approach to this is a universal and exponentially declining 
upper limit on assembled nuclear explosives held by any country configured in a manner to be permanently 
compatible with no further tritium production by the Umted States or Russia (c f  Clifford Smger and Amy 
Sands Program m Arms Control Disarmament and International Security July 2002 report on Keys to 
Unblocking Multilateral Nuclear Arms Control and references therein) Such an approach appears compatible 
with those of Chma and India if not all that those countries espouse in their formal positions The Umted States 
and its European partners need not actively endorse such an approach it would be sufficient for them to simply 
abide its discussion while taking actions expected m any case to configure their arsenals for the readily 
foreseeable future to be compatible with it (as discussed above)
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A moratorium on new production of fìssile matenals for nuclear weapons programs is a necessary 
condition for establishing comprehensive global cooperation on fully securing such matenals against 
unauthorized use by state or non state actors However the primary problem with madequately secured nuclear 
matenals still lies m Russia, and without enhancement of the cooperative threat reduction program this is likely 
to remain the case throughout the present decade As the recent generation of specialists who insist that 
plutonium is an economically valuable matenal gradually lose their influence m Russia and elsewhere it may 
become possible to streamline the cooperative threat reduction program to concentrate on accelerating secure 
storage of fìssile matenals and disassembly of excess weapons rather than on more expensive programs to 
promptly use excess weapons plutonium for energy production In this case it might become possible to 
enhance the effectiveness of cooperative threat reduction programs without any net mcrease in financial outlays
Finally while the international agreement on the BWC that the current Bush administration rejected was 
far from ideal acceptmg it as a base for further progress would almost certainly be more effective than trying to 
start over again from scratch If a future administration is willing to sign such an agreement then they might 
most fruitfully try to move on to a comprehensive and more effective global licensing mechanism to help keep 
dangerous organisms and technologies out of unauthorized hands Elementary licensing constraints have been 
lacking on a global basis are m the interests of major commercial interests as well as almost all states and 
should be more readily negotiable than intrusive inspection procedures aimed at detecting large scale state 
sponsored biological weapons programs In the end, however a broadly based and effective licensing program 
may be just as effective m complicating the establishment of new biological weapons programs and the spread 
of new types of biological weapons technology
To address all of the questions raised here is beyond the scope of the present discussion but we will 
examine three particular questions m more detail First, what is likely to be technically practical for U S NMD 
deployments for the current and next U S administration7 For a given level of funding this will determine what 
deployments future administrations are likely to inherit and then possibly freeze Second, what are U S Air 
Force plans for use of outer space and defense of space assets7 Answers to this question may help shed light on 
whether there is anything m the works other than unbounded NMD that is likely to preclude cooperation with 
Chma on multilateral approaches to WMD Third, how is continuing EU integration likely to impact EU and 
member countries approaches to multilateral cooperation on WMD7 So far the other EU countries have largely 
deferred to France and Britain on these matters especially m the context of EU policymaking It would be 
interesting to have some insight on whether and when EU countries may become more effective m pulling 
together on these matters as this decade wears on and if so in what directions they are likely to pull
In addition to these questions being posed following the address by Amb John Richardson there were 
presentations on 3 Apnl 2002 by the following speakers (The conclusions drawn from the presentations of 
Amb Richardson and other speakers and interventions from the audiences are those of the editor only and 
should not be taken as representing the views of the speakers themselves )
Lt Col David LaRivee Umted States Air Force
Academic year 2001 2002 National Defense Fellow
Program in Arms Control Disarmament, and International Security
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Malcolm Savidge
Member of Parliament Aberdeen North UK
Convenor of the all party parliamentary group on global security and non proliferation
Prof Jeremiah Sullivan
Department of Physics
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Of particular concern m the context of EU day was the perception in Europe of U S foreign policy m the early 
part of 2002 with a few months distance from the immediate reaction from the attacks on the United States of 
11 September of the previous year Concern that the U S administration was perceived m Europe as having not 
sufficiently pulled back from its early unilateralist approach appeared uniform amongst those who addressed 
this topic U S national missile defense policies remained a bone of contention at the time The U S approach
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to broader concerns relating to international agreements such as the biological weapons convention the Kyoto 
accord on global warming and mtemational courts were also seen as complicating relations between the United 
States and the European Umon As noted above there are also substantial differences between the United States 
and the three largest EU countries on the question of military uses of outer space but in this case European 
preferences for avoiding weapons in space are generally expressed as a policy preference rather than a policy 
priority Of course a determination clearly remains m Europe to make common cause with the United States on 
foreign policy wherever possible Still these differences do point out the potential utility of the Umted States 
accommodating European wishes on issues such as broadening the moratorium on production of fissile 
matenals for weapons programs where the pnmary source of disagreement is on the means to this end rather 
than on the goal itself
Technical considerations suggest that the differences between U S and EU approaches to national missile 
defense and military uses of outer space may not prove to be particularly important m the long run One view 
was that U S national missile defense development has been driven by domestic politics and ideological 
commitment at the expense of inadequate attention to integration of technology and policy This has led to 
unrealistic deployment schedules for a system that will be vulnerable to disruption not cost effective at the 
margin and perhaps not functional at all Accordmg to its management the system being developed is a layered 
approach to boost mid course and terminal interception This leads to senous problems and massive 
expenditure requirements for adequate coverage (particularly for boost and terminal interception) and for target 
discrimination (particularly for mid course interception) Adequate coverage is also a concern for mid course 
interception Any more sizeable angle between target and interceptor trajectories that m tests performed so far 
will make mid course interception even more difficult than it has been By 2004 a symbolic system might 
possibly be fielded, but anything effective will take until at least 2008-2010 Russia has had greater problems 
with U S withdrawal from the Antibalhstic Missile Treaty than Chma but m fact budget limits will probably 
impose the cap on U S national missile defense that was inferred above to be necessary for China to cooperate 
fully with broadening of a moratorium on production of fissile matenals for weapons programs
With respect to military uses of outer space its is a sober analysis of mission requirements rather than 
technical feasibility that is most likely to constrain activities of the type that the Umted States larger European 
partners have little enthusiasm for Fust consider the possible need for further developing U S anti satellite 
technology beyond the level that was developed but not made operational in the 1990s It is possible that 
replacing c ten billion dollars worth of U S military assets currently m space over the next ten years with 
comparable technology could leave them vulnerable in about ten years to capabilities of one or more other 
countries The loss of these assets would risk setting U S military operations back to c 1980 and would thus be 
considered a very senous occurrence (Anti satellite technology could be particularly relevant to defense of 
these assets if maneuverable satellites rather than ground launched interceptors were developed by other 
countnes as a potential space weapon ) However a trend towards mimatunzation could increase survivability of 
U S space assets (e g from c 25 percent to c 75 percent survivability) even in the absence of other defensive 
technologies leaving enough assets in space for the United States to complete ground operations (without 
necessarily having to turn attention to preventing or deterring threats agamst space assets at the same time)
Next consider a possible future need for U S interference with other countnes space assets So far this has 
not been necessary For example the United States simply bought out other countnes space based 
reconnaissance capabilities during the recent Afghan campaign Even if an occasion where capability threat of 
use of force agamst other space based assets is desired there remams the question of whether this would be 
done from the ground without putting objects m orbit using orbiting objects launched only for the occasion 
using orbiting objects not pnmanly designed for that purpose or using pre positioned orbiting space weapons 
There is also the question of whether the capabilities of another countnes assets would be temporanly 
interfered with (e g by blocking a signal or line of sight) or permanently damaged or destroyed Whether 
threatening or proceeding to non destructively block a signal or line of sight would be considered a threat or use 
of force raises interesting questions concerning the legal status of space objects Thus even if it is considered 
inevitable that there will be conflict m space (or at least the need for deterring certain uses of space) this does 
not necessarily imply that the permanent stationing of weapons m space will be viewed as essential
Finally consider ground strike For ground based assets traversing space this is of course a well established 
technology (embodied in the intermediate and long range missiles of many countnes) Thus even though new
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non nuclear weapons technologies of this type are under consideration we consider here only attacks on the 
earth using assets pre positioned in orbit Of these the most difficult to emulate with assets that are normally 
ground based is fielding a space based laser system but this is unlikely to be accomplished until beyond at least 
2030
This matenal provides an mteresting background perspective for material relevant to subsequent 
discussions m international forums Reported below are some comments on the Nonproliferation Treaty review 
conference in May of 2002 Of particular interest are subsequent discussions of military uses of outer space that 
took place in Berlin 10 11 June 2002 where a new proposal for the Geneva Conference on Disarmament later 
that month received its first public ainng
NPT 2002 Prepcom
Prof Clifford Singer and Malcolm Savidge MP were mvited by the Institute for Energy and Environmental 
Research (IEER) to a 9 Apnl workshop and the events open to non governmental organizations (NGOs) of the 
April 2002 preparatory committee for the 2005 review conference of the parties to the Treaty on Non 
proliferation of nuclear weapons (the NPT 2002 Prepcom ) As a result of recent changes m security 
arrangements it turned out to be necessary for the Program in Arms Control Disarmament and International 
Security to register as an NGO with the United Nations for this purpose Under the Reaching Critical Will 
project a 7 Apnl meeting to coordinate 10 Apnl NGO presentations at the Prepcom was coordinated by Emily 
Schroeder for the International Women s League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) with the active participation 
of Merav Detan for International Physicians for Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) and Physicians for Social 
Responsibility (PSR) The schedule for the 9 Apnl IEER workshop and reception speakers was as follows
Nuclear Dangers and the State of Secunty Treaties
Conference hosted by the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research
11 00 11 10 
11 10 12 30
2 00 3 30 pm
3 45 5 00 pm
7 00 7 30 pm
8 00 9 00 pm
Welcome and Introductions -  Michele Boyd (IEER)
The state of treaty compliance
Compliance with secunty treaties Overview -  Nicole Deller
State of the ABM CTBT and Kyoto Protocol -  Aijun Makhijam (IEER)
NPT compliance -  John Burroughs (Lawyer s Committee on Nuclear Policy)
The role of treaty compliance and nuclear nonproliferation
The function of treaties m mtemational secunty -  Merav Detan (IPPNW/PSR)
International law related to terronsm
Peter Weiss (Lawyer s Committee on Nuclear Policy)
Technical issues related to nuclear proliferation
The Non Proliferation Treaty nuclear disarmament and terronsm
Jayantha Dhanapala (UN Under Secretary General for Disarmament)
Panel response and discussion (Aijun Makhijam IEER moderator)
A new era of proliferation View from Russia
Alla Yaroshmskaya (Ecological Foundation Russia)
Response by Admiral (Ret ) L Ramdas
India Pak People s Forum for Peace and Democracy
Information from the United Nations on the NPT 2002 Prepcom was accessible as of 8 July 2002 at 
http //www un org/depts/dda/WMD/NPT/2005/
The NPT 2002 Prepcom was designated with a status evaluation rather programmatic focus This was done 
in order to avoid a retread of the expenence that many delegations had with the frustration of a more product 
oriented agenda at the NPT 1997 Prepcom Of the nuclear weapons states parties to the NPT Russia made a 
particularly strong statement in favor of deep bilateral reductions of nuclear weapons holdings reiterating its
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willingness for a prompt reduction m a bilateral context to a limit of 1500 strategically deliverable warheads 
Russia also supported multilateral reductions to minimum levels consistent with strategic stability which would 
presumably imply much deeper reductions The United Kingdom and France supported the principle of 
irreversibility of nuclear build down with examples from their own activities A number of non nuclear 
weapons states on the other hand expressed particular exasperation with the results of the most recent U S 
nuclear posture review and amongst all states parties to the NPT there was no support and much derision of the 
U S announcement of intent to withdraw from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty While there was some 
approbation for the willingness of states not parties to the NPT to allow fissile matenals production cutoff treaty 
negotiations to proceed, this was tempered by repeated expressions of annoyance with the non universality of 
the NPT NGO presentations at the Prepcom and other meetings referred to above continued and expanded upon 
this litany with particular attention to the importance of existing and unproved mtemational legal commitments 
and recent problems with compliance m spmt and arguably also m letter
Despite apparent stalemate on issues beyond the bilateral delivery vehicle build down movmg forward by 
the Umted States and Russia there was an undercurrent suggesting the possibility of productive cooperation on 
unproved security for storage of radioactive matenals Several countnes emphasized the importance of this 
issue m light of the current mtemational situation However the 2002 Prepcom followed fairly quickly on the 
heels of the attacks of last 11 September and was not product onented It was thus not expected that more 
specific proposals along these lines would be forthcoming
In the evemng session of the IEER meeting it was pomted out that the United Nations Secretary General 
had expressed an mterest m another special UN session on disarmament but this did not meet with favor from 
any of the five nuclear weapons states parties to the NPT Given the unsurprisingly discouraging response that 
quenes on this issue had produced a year earlier m Geneva it was noteworthy that the Secretary General would 
have nevertheless floated this idea Now that it has been more explicitly confirmed that the time for this is not 
npe it will likely be at least a couple of years before the eventual prospects for such a special session can even 
be used as a conceptually convenient mechanism for developing more detailed proposals for nuclear weapons 
build down than already afloat m the context of the 13 step program described above
Space Weapons
Whether to negotiate or simply discuss prevention of an arms race in outer space is the contention that is 
formally blocking progress at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament This issue has been of particular mterest 
to a set of German analysts since 1984 when a group of them drafted a proposed Treaty on the Limitation of the 
Military Use of Outer Space To explore avenues for unblocking the impasse at the Conference on 
Disarmament the project being reported on here supported a workshop in Berlin on 10 June 2002 entitled by 
the organizer Space Weapons Ban-How Can It Be Achieved*? The conference was organized by Regina 
Hagen of the International Network of Engmeers and Scientists Agamst Proliferation (INESAP) On the 
afternoon of 11 June the conference participants met for a discussion with Rudiger Ludekmg from Nuclear 
Disarmament and Nonproliferation in the German Foreign Ministry The program for the 10 June discussions is 
listed at the end of this section
An important theme of this conference that is relevant to the rest of the activities reported here was a 
continuing tension This is between proposals for broad based bans on military activities in space and what is 
plausible to achieve given the increasingly important military role that space assets have acquired m the past 
two decades Ground launched anti satellite capabilities are of particular concern m this regard and will be 
discussed here first Then attention will be turned to the stationing of weapons m space and the problem of 
distinguishing between weapons use and weapons capabilities
A draft Treaty on the Limitation of the Military Use of Outer Space was presented by H Fischer 
R Labusch E Maus andJ Scheffran at a 1984 conference m Gottingen This draft treaty paid particular 
attention to anti satellite issues not dealt with in the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in 
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies commonly known as 
the Outer Space Treaty The Outer Space Treaty reserves the moon and other celestial bodies for peaceful 
purposes With respect to the rest of outer space the Outer Space Treaty guarantees universal rights of passage
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and scientific investigation but says only that the use of outer space shall be earned out for the benefit of and 
in the interests of countnes (from Article I) in accordance with international law including the Charter of 
the Umted Nations m the mterest of international peace and secunty and promoting international cooperation 
and understanding (from Article III) There was discussion at the conference on whether this merely treats 
outer space like the high seas which would allow extensive and various military activities or should be 
interpreted more restnctively given the more evolved international political context m which it entered mto 
force What is clear is that die Outer Space treaty calls for no specific verification mechanisms beyond a 
unspecified consultation mechanism except than notification of the United Nations of peaceful uses of outer 
space and open access as practicable to facilities on the moon or other celestial bodies
The Gottingen draft treaty recognizes the international secunty role of outer space more explicitly than the 
Outer Space Treaty The Gottingen draft treaty preamble explicitly recognizes ‘that satellites with venfication 
and reconnaissance functions are an indispensable element of strategic stability It also declares the 
prospective States Parties CONVINCED that, as long as nuclear deterrence appears to be an indispensable 
means of preserving world peace stability would be jeopardized by satellite systems whose deployment 
drastically changes the basis of this stability It goes on to require prospective States Parties ‘not to destroy 
damage disturb the normal functioning or change the flight trajectory of space objects of other states not to
develop and test or deploy m outer space m the atmosphere or on the earth any weapons or weapons systems 
which serve this purpose to undertake by mutual agreement to observe minimal approach distances between 
then- space objects and *to destroy any anti satellite systems that they may already have (A space object is 
defined as any object manned or not stationed on celestial bodies m orbit around the earth or any other 
manner m outer space ) U S national missile defense systems were generally agreed to have anti satellite 
capability and would be incompatible with this draft treaty which in any case reaffirms the objections to the 
Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
It is interesting to contrast the draft Gottingen treaty with the draft of a Joint Working Paper by the 
Delegations of China and the Russian Federation that was given its first public airing at the Berlin meetings 
being described here The preamble to this jomt draft concentrates on the danger of armed confrontation and 
combatant activities being extended to outer space the prevention of the deployment of weapons and an arms 
rate m outer space and ‘the prevention of the threat or use of force agamst outer space objects This draft 
would prohibit the placement of weapons m orbit around the earth It would also prohibit threat or use of force 
against outer space objects but not explicitly their testing or even their deployment on the ground for launch 
By working with Russia on a joint proposal China has evidently managed to focus on a proposal which skirts 
several very problematic issues One is the potential use of maneuverable satellites or other means to interfere 
with the normal functioning of satellites without actually damaging them (e g by temporarily obstructing their 
line of sight or transmissions) Another is the development and testing of ground launched systems with anti 
satellite capability including but not necessanly limited to U S exo atmospheric missile defense systems Nor 
does this jomt proposal refer to maintenance of strategic stability or the ABM Treaty As such it both transcends 
the Cold War context of the Gottingen draft treaty and avoids the clearly fatal flaw from a practical point of 
view of being incompatible with current U S administration policy and a previously passed U S Congressional 
policy on national missile defense
Where the Gottingen draft treaty and the new joint Chmese and Russian proposal both run afoul of current 
U S administration policy is m their call for a treaty implementation and one that would permanently ban the 
placement of weapons in space In the Gottingen draft treaty the prospective States Parties would undertake not 
only not to resort to the use of space based weapons against targets in outer space in the atmosphere or on the 
earth but also not to develop and test or deploy m outer space any weapons of this kind and not to utilize 
any space based system for direct guidance of nuclear weapons (e g on cruise missiles or bombers) The new 
Russian/Chmese proposal is less expansive on this but would still create a basic obligation not to place m orbit 
around the Earth any objects carrying any kmds of weapons not to install such weapons on celestial bodies or 
not to station such weapons m outer space in any other manner Another space preservation treaty draft 
discussed at the conference was even more aggressive in its prohibition of research and development activities 
than the Gottingen draft treaty
The continuing impasse on these issues at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament raised the issue of how 
progress might actually be made a matter discussed in the editor s comments m the next section
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Space Weapons Ban -  How Can It Be Achieved 
Berlm-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften 
Convened by
Program m Arms Control Disarmament and International Security (ACDIS) 
International Network of Engineers and Scientists Agamst Proliferation (INESAP) 
Federation of German Scientists (Vereinigung Deutscher Wissenschaftler VDW)
9 30 10 00 Welcome and workshop introduction 
Jurgen Scheffran (INESAP Darmstadt/Berlm) 
Gotz Neuneck (VDW Hamburg)
10 00 10 30 Peaceful Use and Common Security in Outer Space 
Detlev Wolter (Berlin)
10 30 11 00 Peaceful Use of Outer Space -  Obstacles and Challenges 
Wulf von Knes (German Space Agency Köln Germany)
11 00 11 30 The Link Between Missile Defense and Space Weapomzation 
Ivan Safranchuk (Center for Defense Information Moscow)
12 00 13 15 Possible Elements of the Future International Legal Instruments on PAROS 
Jomt Working Paper of China and Russia to be introduced at the Conference on 
Disarmament m June 2002 presented by Fu Zhiang (Permanent Mission of the 
People s Republic of China to the UN Office at Geneva)
Commentary Bemd Kubbig (Frankfurt Peace Research Institute Germany)
14 15 15 30 Space Preservation Act of 2002 and World Space Treaty 
Carol Rosin (Institute for Cooperation in Space Ventura CA USA) 
Commentary Ian Kenyon (Mountbatten Centre for International Studies 
Southampton UK)
16 00 17 15 Proposed Treaty on the Limitation of the Military Use of Outer Space
drafted by German scientists m 1984 presented by 
Jurgen Scheftran (INESAP)
Commentary Jurgen Altman (Naturwissenschafterlnnen Initiative 
Bochum Dusseldorf Germany)
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Here two questions will be addressed First can progress on prevention of the further militarization of space 
take place more easily within the Geneva Conference on Disarmament or outside of it9 Second what are 
potentially realizable goals9
The argument for working outside of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) is that it is stuck The CD 
agenda can only be approved as a whole Since the completion of the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty text 
there have been three parts to this whole One part is the formation of an ad hoc committee for discussions on 
the future of nuclear disarmament Until recently Russia and the United States blocked this but then each 
somewhat tentatively agreed to allow this on the agenda The second part is negotiation of a cutoff of the 
production of fissile matenals for nuclear weapons programs This was bnefly initiated until an impasse 
developed over the third part of the agenda This is on the problem of prevention of an arms race in outer space 
(or PAROS) China insists that there should be negotiations for PAROS The United States has been agreeable 
only to discussions
The unpasse on the CD agenda is not just a procedural problem It is hardly surpnsing that Chma is 
reluctant to put a cap on its own strategic nuclear capabilities until the United States is willing to put a cap on its 
national missile defense plans And space based assets like infra red detectors are essential to U S national 
missile defense plans Nevertheless Chma has recently agreed with Russia on a jomt proposal on PAROS 
negotiations that could help move the agenda on the CD forward The essential obligations under this proposal 
would be to avoid placmg weapons m space or resorting to *016 threat or use of force against outer space 
objects
Compared to previous Chmese proposals for PAROS that would have been clearly incompatible with U S 
national missile defense plans this new joint proposal could in principle allow the development and even 
deployment of missile defense systems that also have anti satellite capabilities so long as these capabilities 
were not used to explicitly threaten or destroy objects m orbit around the Earth It still seems unlikely that China 
would completely decouple other issues from missile defense if the Umted States looked intent on an unlimited 
national missile defense build up or transfer of significant theater missile defense capabilities to Taiwan On the 
Chmese and Russian sides there nevertheless now seems to be a possibility of making progress in the CD This 
is perhaps with the expectation that technical and financial difficulties and political developments will 
ultimately provide acceptable limits on U S missile defense plans m any case
The fissile matenals production cutoff is widely recognized as bemg a logical and necessary step on the 
path towards cooperation on comprehensive global nuclear management that would much more reliably secure 
nuclear weapons matenals from possible diversion to non state actors Much of the needed progress can be 
made on a bilateral basis But it is hard to imagine all of the states with nuclear weapons potential developmg 
the transparency and cooperation needed for truly comprehensive global nuclear management while several of 
them still maintain a shroud of secrecy over new fissile matenals production for additional nuclear weapons As 
long as the CD is meant to deal with such questions at all it will remain the focal pomt for finalizing an 
understanding on the cutoff of production of fissile matenals for weapons programs
There is nevertheless much to be said for the idea that attempts to make progress on this nexus of issues 
should not be confined to the CD alone One reason for this is that the current U S administration seems to have 
difficulty with putting enough emphasis on furthenng formal multilateral nuclear arms control negotiations to 
successfully unblock the CD This situation is likely to last from two to six years and perhaps longer Even if a
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future U S administration does put a priority on a broader fissile matenals production cutoff however there is 
still a powerful reason for taking part of the discussion on outer space outside of the CD
The basic problem is that there is a tension between a broader goal of restnctmg the military use of space 
and the narrower range of possibilities that can be entertained within the CD without getting m the way of 
fissile matenal production cutoff negotiations Thus what is needed is a consensus that these broader goals will 
be pursued outside of the CD Then only what is mutually acceptable to the essential players will be addressed 
under the PAROS topic within the CD For this to occur m a timely manner the approach within the CD will 
need largely to stay away from the most central components of U S An Force plans for use of space over the 
next twenty years or so
One approach that might be practicable is to split discussions on military uses of outer space into two parts 
Within the CD it might even be possible to come to an agreement on banning all military activities beyond geo 
synchronous orbit along with promoting related confidence building measures Previously this could have been 
difficult, because detection of energetic particles m the earth s magnetosphere from nuclear explosions was 
considered to be of potential military importance Now such activities m that part of the earth s magnetosphere 
that extends beyond geosynchronous orbit can safely be considered a peaceful verification activity rather than a 
military activity Indeed no military activities are currently foreseen m the region beyond geosynchronous 
orbit Nevertheless banning military activities in this realm could still be of fundamental long term importance 
It would extend the concept of the de militarization of Antarctica to the whole of the solar system and beyond 
except m the tiny region of it to which we currently pay the most attention
Discussions in one or more coordmated projects outside of the CD could then get deeper mto thornier 
problems on definition of terms of reference and transparency and verification than is likely to be possible 
within the CD context over the next few years With respect to stationing weapons in space there may in fact be 
only one type of weapon on the conceptual drawing board that cannot better be launched from the ground when 
needed rather than stationed m orbit This is the space based laser Other missions can better be earned out by 
standard or high velocity cruise missiles or perhaps with ballistic kinetic energy weapons that are launched 
when needed If conventional or even nuclear weapons are stationed m space they are generally m the wrong 
place m orbit to get to a target faster than then ground air or sea launched counterparts So it is overly 
expensive and inefficient to place them m orbit ahead of time
In pnnciple the space based laser could be an exception to this rule A large number of these devices would 
still be needed in orbit for continuous global coverage However they could m pnnciple sinke almost instantly 
Nevertheless there are many problems They will only work if at all under ideal atmosphenc conditions They 
are comparatively easy to harden against except for a limited class of targets They would also have very limited 
target coverage They would be large expensive tncky to maintain and extremely vulnerable to counterattack 
Their emplacement could easily cause more secunty problems than it solves They are likely to be extremely 
politically unpopular around the globe They could even be viewed as a potential interference with national 
sovereignty and thus be viewed legally legitimate targets for deactivation by another country or consortium 
With careful attention to technical detail and the relevant international and domestic politics setting up a 
politically attractive mechanism for stopping the development of space based lasers might save the U S Air 
Force from a great deal of needless and ultimately unproductive expenditure
So far only discussions and negotiations m a multilateral context have been covered here For any of what 
is proposed here to bear fruit there is one set of bilateral negotiations that must move forward The United 
States and China will have to put a higher priority m their strategic discussions on developing and 
understanding how to manage differing views of missile defense and military use of outer space while still 
moving forward towards a broader based halt on production of fissile materials for weapons purposes
There is one possibly hopeful sign on this President Bush recently enunciated the view that dealing with 
terrorism will require a new global concert, not just an enduring arrangement between Russia and NATO It s a 
big if but i f  Bush is capable of getting his bureaucracy to follow through on the logical consequences of this 
it may finally become possible to engage in a really serious and productive strategic dialogue with China on 
these This would entail not just continuing to walk the tightrope between the one China policy and the Taiwan 
Defense Act It would entail engagmg m a serious dialogue on how weapons of mass destruction are to be 
handled in the relationship between the United States and China This need not mean that China and the Umted
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States share the same view about how much missile defense preparation is needed to deal with the theoretical 
possibility of more states acquiring intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities It should be sufficient to come 
to an understanding that this possibility will not be used as a cover for undermining what China views to be 
fundamental strategic security without effective consultation
In this context, taking part of the discussion on PAROS outside the CD could be quite helpful This could 
provide another avenue for discussions on the military role of space that do not have to be officially supported 
by Washington If properly constructed this could provide a forum for various countries to express their 
broader concerns Then they could no longer insist that these be engaged within the CD before any discussions 
on other critical issues can proceed In practical terms discussions starting outside the CD could even lead to an 
understanding on space based lasers and perhaps some other issues as well In any case they could play a useful 
role in unblocking the CD
Finally it is necessary to make some comments on timing Even after last 11 September before the recent 
attack on the Indian parliament there seemed to be little or no possibility of the CD delivering a fissile matenals 
production cutoff treaty text before the end of this decade The fundamental reason was that it seemed that 
Pakistan would insist on having at least this long to build its nuclear arsenal up to what it sees as a minimum 
deterrence level vis à vis India That Pakistan does not yet have effective minimum deterrence is evident from 
the fact that India is willing to threaten war even following Pakistan s explicit demonstration in 1998 of the 
ability to make a nuclear explosion However what may be coming clear from current events is that it does not 
really matter how many nuclear bombs Pakistan has Pakistan s ruling elite maintains its current way of life 
only through external financial support, and the outside world has made it clear that India will be allowed to 
demand a halt to support for incursions mto Kashmir whether Pakistan has nuclear weapons or not While it 
still seems unlikely it is thus possible that a moratorium on fissile matenals production for weapons programs 
that includes South Asia may now even become possible within the next few years With careful attention to the 
appropnate division and pursuit of issues to be addressed within and outside of the CD it could thus be possible 
to have such a moratonum years earlier than might otherwise be achieved
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